University of the Pacific

Scholarly Commons
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles

McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship

1985

The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Report on Hotel
Employees & (and) Restaurant Employees International Union: Will
RICO Take a Walk on the Boardwalk with Local 54 Symposium Perspectives on Organized Crime
Michael Vitiello
University of the Pacific, mvitiello@pacific.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael Vitiello, The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Report on Hotel Employees & (and)
Restaurant Employees International Union: Will RICO Take a Walk on the Boardwalk with Local 54
Symposium - Perspectives on Organized Crime, 16 RUTGERS L.J. 671 (1985).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles/618

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship at
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS REPORT ON HOTEL
EMPLOYEES & RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES
INTERNATIONAL UNION: WILL RICO TAKE A
WALK ON THE BOARDWALK WITH LOCAL 54?
Michael Vitiello*

In Elia Kazan's 1954 film On the Waterfront, shortly after arranging
the murder of Joey Doyle, a dock worker turned witness, Johnny Friendly,
labor boss and racketeer, boasts to his mobster flunkies and to hero Terry
Malloy:
You know, taking over this local took some doing. There were some
pretty rough fellows in the way. .

.

. Well, I got 2000 dues paying

members in this local. That's 72,000 a year legitimate. And when each one
of them puts in a couple of bucks a day just to make sure the work's steady,
well, figure it out. That's just for openers. We got the fattest piers and the
fattest harbor in the world. Everything moves in and out, we take our
cut . ..
You don't suppose I can afford to be boxed out of a deal like this, do
you? A deal I sweated and bled for just on account of one lousy little cheese
eater, that Doyle bum who believes he can go squeal to the crime
commission, do you?'
2
Although one may doubt the existence of a nationwide crime syndicate,
domination of numerous unions by organized crime families is not merely
popularized fiction. 3

* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola School of Law, New Orleans; B.A. Swarthmore
College, 1969; J.D. University of Pennsylvania, 1974. Mr. Vitiello is a member of the
Pennsylvania and New Jersey bars.
1. On the Waterfront, a Columbia Picture's production, starred Marion Brando as
Terry Malloy, Eva Marie Saint as Edie Doyle, Lee J. Cobb as Johnny Friendly, Rod Steiger
as Brando's brother, and Karl Maiden as Father Barry. In the same scene cited above,
additional corrupt labor practices were discussed, including threatened refusal to unload
bananas unless the shipowner paid the local, i.e., Friendly, $2,000.
2. See Hawkins, God and the Mafia, 14 PUB. INT. 24 (1969), reprinted in G.
HAWKINS & F. ZIMRING, THE PURSUIT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 157 (1984).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069, 1071 (2d Cir.) (defendant
Clemente depicted at trial as "ringleader of a highly organized enterprise that had
infiltrated all aspects of waterfront business, including labor, shipping, and ship-servicing;"
Clemente controlled waterfront, in part by virtue of his position of authority over officials of
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Beginning in the 1950's, the McClellan hearings demonstrated the
connection between various unions and organized crime.4 Those hearings
may have been sensationalized (they were the stuff on which political
careers were made), 5 but the reported link has been borne out. 6 As
observed in a leading article on labor racketeering, unions are tempting
targets for organized crime snydicates:
The great increase in fringe benefit renumeration in the last twenty years
and the resulting increase in labor pension, health and welfare trust funds
has made the potential for racketeering substantial. .

.

. Although some

corrupt unionists still steal members' dues, it is, as a practical matter,
unnecessary; the opportunities are greater and the risks slighter in
manipulating welfare and pension funds."
When New Jersey voters approved casino gambling for Atlantic City,
there was immediate concern about a take-over of the casinos by organized
crime families: not only might crime syndicates buy into casinos, but they
would also predictably gain influence through their control of unions
servicing the industry. 8 New Jersey passed stringent legislation to prevent
New Jersey International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) locals), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 820 (1981); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (defendant Scotto,
president of ILA local in Brooklyn, extorted substantial sums of money from shipping

stevedore companies by virtue of his union position), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
Anthony Scotto, one of the defendants in the latter case, was identified as a capodecinain
the Carlo Gambino "family" in the Senate report accompanying the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68 (1982).
ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE TOGETHER WITH INDIVIDUAL AND ADDITIONAL

VIEWS TO ACCOMPANY S.

30, S. REP. No. 617, 91 st Cong., I st Sess. 39 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as RICO Senate Report]. Clemente boasted that he was "grooming" Scotto for
promotion within the ILA. 640 F.2d at 1078.
4. See infra notes 104-42 and accompanying text.
5. See A. SCHLESINGER, ROBERT KENNEDY AND His TIMES 137-69 (1978) for a
description of Robert F. Kennedy's role as chief counsel for the Senate Select Committee on
Improper Activities in Labor or Management Field, and of Kennedy's single-minded
pursuit of Teamsters' President Jimmy Hoffa that brought Kennedy national attention.
The "spotlight [on the McClellan committee] played particularly on chief counsel [Robert

Kennedy]." Id. at 149.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
820 (198 1); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961

(1981). See also Blakey & Goldstock, "On the Waterfront".RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 341-42 (1980).
7. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 6, at 343. See also PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, HOTEL EMPLOYEES

& RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, S. REP. No. 595, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., 8 (1984) ("Prepaid welfare plans are a magnet for criminal schemes due to their
methods of cash receipt and disbursement.") [hereinafter cited as PSI Report].
8. See Atlantic City's Struggle Against the Mafia, 90 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,

19851

HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION

that result." Despite oversight by New Jersey's Casino Crime Commission,
there have been various reports of mob involvement in Atlantic City's

casinos.' 0
During 1983 and 1984, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations (PSI) conducted hearings on the connection of the Hotel
Employees and Restaurant Employees (HERE) International Union
(HEREIU) with organized crime." The subcommittee's report did not
41-43 (1981); Trouble in Las Vegas East, 111 TIME, Jan. 16, 1978, 14-15 (1981).
9. Casino Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12-1 to 183 (West Supp. 1985-1986).
The act established the Casino Control Commission with broad regulatory authority over
casinos and related industries. Id. It also established a Division of Gaming Enforcement to
investigate all applicants for licenses, certificates, or permits, and to prosecute violations of
the act or regulations promulgated under the act. See id. The act requires registration with
the Commission of every labor organization seeking to represent casino employees licensed
under the act. Id. at 5:12-93 to -95. Further, it permits disqualification of a union if an
officer, agent or principal employee of the union is associated with professional criminals.
Id. at 5:12-86(f).
10. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1984, § B, at 2, col. 1, in which it was reported that
former Atlantic City Mayor Michael J. Matthews allegedly:
described numerous meetings with Frank Lentino and other associates of the
organized crime family headed by Nicodemo Scarfo of Atlantic City. "Mr. Lentino
[is] an organizer for Local 54 of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees and
Bartenders Union in Atlantic City ..
"
The confession summary says one of many admissions Mr. Matthews made
was that "in December 1981 he met with Frank Gerace, Al Diadone and Frank
Lentino in regards to his mayoral campaign and support he needed from them."
Mr. Gerace is president of the union. Albert Diadone was vice president then
but resigned later when he was indicted on charges of conspiracy to murder a union
rival.
"Matthews made it clear to the above individuals that he needed approximately $125,000 to win the election," the summary says. "Matthews stated he
understood that Gerace, Lentino and Diadone were speaking to him as representatives of the organized-crime family headed by Nicky Scarfo."
The indictment charges that Mr. Matthews got the $125,000, plus other
payments, "in return for Matthew's agreement to corruptly utilize the Mayor's
officer to assist the Scarfo organization wherever possible."
Id.
11. PSI Report, supra note 7. The PSI investigation began in mid-1981 with a dual
focus: "the alleged ties between the union and organized crime interests and the effect of
any such ties upon the union's general assets and its pension and health and welfare funds;
and (2) the possible diminution of members' rights by actions taken either at the
International or local level." Id. at 3. The subcommittee initially studied existing evidence
collected by federal and state agencies. That evidence alerted the subcommittee to misuse of
benefit funds of some of the larger HERE locals, a subject that became the focus of the
remainder of the investigation. id. The subcommittee began sets of public hearings in June
1982. Its April 1983 hearing featured Joseph Hauser, a federally protected witness, who
alerted the subcommittee to "organized crime ties to HEREIU officials ..
" Id. at 3-4.
That hearing expanded the inquiry of its subsequent investigation and led to its conclusion
that there is a substantial link between HEREIU and organized crime. Id. at 4-5, 7.
Hauser has proven to be an effective witness in previous federal prosecutions under the
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deal exclusively with Atlantic City, but did uncover mismanagement and
corrupt practices by leaders of Atlantic City HERE Local 54.12 Further, it
concluded that" . . . there is little doubt the Local 54 (Atlantic City) is
now controlled . . .by organized crime interests."' 3
The Senate is not charged with bringing prosecutions against corrupt
union officials and, quite correctly, the subcommittee referred further
investigation to the Department of Labor "to determine if civil or criminal
violations have occurred and to correct abuses to insure that [union]
members' rights are protected." 4 The subcommittee suggested, however,
that the laws governing corrupt union practices are inadequate to remedy
problems which it identified. It implied that some corrupt union practices
were beyond the intent of federal law. 15 Further it stated that "...
criminal prosecutions under [the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act] are rarely brought and are difficult to sustain."1 6 The
subcommittee made no reference to other provisions governing racketeering1 7 or to successful prosecutions of numerous labor racketeers across the
RICO statute. See, e.g., United States v. Marcello, 537 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. La. 1982),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Roemer, 703 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.) (upholding RICO
conspiracy conviction of Carlos Marcello, reputed New Orleans area Mafia boss, and
Charles Roemer, Louisiana Commissioner of Administration, secured as result of government's BRI LAB investigation which featured Hauser as key participant), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 935 (1983).
12. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 3, 63-67, 110-21. For a discussion of some of these
practices, see infra notes 60-102 and accompanying text.
13. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 7. Support for the committee's conclusion appears at
pages 63-67 of its report. One witness, Lt. Colonel Justin Dintino of the New Jersey State
Police, testified that Nicodemo Scarfo, head of the Philadelphia organized crime family,
"'has significant influence over Local 54 and has used it to his personal advantage.' "Id. at
64. His influence is facilitated by a "'close personal relationship with Frank Gerace,
[former] president of Local 54.' "Id. Gerace placed various Scarfo associates in key union
positions. Id. at 66. The evidence left little doubt that the Philadelphia crime family was
receiving its tribute money from union benefit plans.
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id. at 9 (suggesting that "spirit" of various federal statutes may be violated, while
"actual intent" may not).
16. Id. (referring to 29 U.S.C. § 501(c)(1982), which provides: "Any person who
embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and wilfully abstracts or converts to his own use, or the use
of another, any of the moneys, funds, securities, property, or other assets of a labor
organization of which he is an officer, or by which he is employed, directly or indirectly, shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.").
17. See, e.g., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 1968 (1984 & Supp. 1985). Section 1961(1) specifically makes labor racketeering acts
predicate crimes which support a RICO violation. See infra notes 274-319 and accompanying text. See also Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 186 (1978 & Supp.
1985) (setting forth restrictions on financial transactions by and between labor and
management); Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1984 & Supp. 1985) (setting forth
restrictions on operation of employee benefit plans).
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country.' 8
This Article summarizes the subcommittee's findings specifically
relating to Local 54. Further, it examines the history and substance of some
of the existing antiracketeering legislation including, most importantly,
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) statute.19 It
discusses the application of those provisions to the facts20 developed in the
subcommittee's report. Specifically, it analyzes how the government might
proceed against officials of Local 54 and their associates under RICO and
what legal issues might be presented by such a prosecution. Finally, it
concludes that apart from the subcommittee's recommended modifications
of the law,21 existing statutory and case law provide ample ammunition to
attack the identified labor racketeering.
I.

THE REPORT OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS AND MOB INFILTRATION OF LOCAL 54

A.

General President Edward T. Hanley
The subcommittee's report deals with corruption in Hotel Employees

and Restaurant Employees International Union (HEREIU), primarily in
the international union itself.2 2 However, its public hearings focused on
several local unions, including Atlantic City HERE Local 54.23 The report

portrays wholesale corruption in both the international union and the
various locals. This section discusses general allegations against Edward T.
Hanley, General President of the international, and specific allegations
relating to Local 54.
18. See, e.g., United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,459
U.S. 1174 (1983); United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1071 (1982); United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 944 (1982); United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 820 (1981); United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 961 (1981).
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
20. This Article is premised on the assumption that evidence before the subcommittee
would also be available to the Justice Department for use before a grand jury and at trial. It
should be noted that both Senator McClellan and the PSI have complained of the difficulty
in obtaining facts about union corruption, largely because unionists frequently have
invoked the fifth amendment before Congress. See PSI Report, supra note 7, at 4, 7;
McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil
Liberties?, 46 N.D. LAWYER 55, 86-92 (1970).
21. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 8-10.
22. See, e.g., id. at 1-10 (summary of PSI investigation), 10-11 (description of
HEREIU's historical background), 17-47 (discussion of HEREIU under former President
Hanley), 103-10 (discussion of HEREIU dental plan).
23. Id. at 3.
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HEREIU was apparently infiltrated by organized crime elements at
least as early as the 1930's."' A special crime commission revealed labor
racketeering in the union, leading to the 1937 conviction of union officials
and expulsion of local union members."
Subsequent investigations by a Senate committee chaired by Senator
John McClellan2" revealed mob infiltration into the Chicago restaurant
industry. 7 Union officials "sold" labor peace, while two attorneys associated with Al Capone siphoned off over a third of a million dollars from
union strike funds.2 8 Local unions were run by individuals who were direct
associates of the Chicago mob. 9
In the early days, control of a HERE local union allowed the mob to
extort money from restaurant owners.30 More recently, HEREIU has
become one of the largest unions in the country with approximately
400,000 members.3 1 As a result, it has amassed attractive pension and
3 2
welfare funds, and become an attractive target for mob involvement.
That is, control of the union allows the mob to skim money from the benefit
funds through an assortment of corrupt practices without resort to
violence.
The PSI Report demonstrates that the union has been corrupt
throughout its existence.3 3 However corrupt the union may have been,
General President Hanley has escalated illegal activity during his eleven
year reign.34 Hanley was originally brought into Chicago Local 278 by
John Lardino, "an associate of [Chicago] organized crime boss Tony
Accardo. . . ." Accardo reportedly hand-picked Hanley for the presi7
dency of HEREIU. 6 Hanley allegedly had ties with other crime bosses
and his ascension to power has been cited as a "classic example of an
24. Id. at 13.
25. Id.
26. The McClellan Committee's official title was the Senate Select Committee on
Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field. See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil
Remedies, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 1009, 1015 n.22 (1980).
27. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 13-14. See infra notes 104-42 and accompanying text.
28. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 14.
29. Id. at 14-15.
30. Id. at 15-16.
31. Id. at 21.
32. Id. at 105, 106. See also Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 6, at 343.
33. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 13-16.
34. Id. at 17-62.
35. Id. at 18.
36. id.
37. Id. at 18-20.
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organized crime take-over of a major labor union." 38
The subcommittee also reported a pattern of abuse of power by
Hanley to the detriment of the union's rank and file members.3 9 Hanley
centralized power from the locals to the international by a series of
amendments to the union's constitution. 0 He abused the power over
mergers and trusteeships to aggregate power: "Mergers provide Hanley
with an opportunity to directly choose the local officers without a local
election, while a local placed in trusteeship is barred from sending
delegates to a convention." 4' 1
The real objection to centralization is the misuse of power. The
subcommittee found substantial evidence indicating that union funds have
been siphoned off to benefit Hanley's crime syndicate friends."2 For
example, shortly after Hanley became president of the international, the
union made a loan to Morris A. Shenker, "a well known St. Louis attorney,
[who] has allegedly acted as a middleman between organized crime and
legitimate business interests."43 Prior to the loan, the General Executive
Board's approval was secured by post and phone polls; apparently, the
circulated proposition contained insufficient information for the requisite
appraisal of the loan. 44 The project failed within two years of the loan and
was forced into involuntary bankruptcy.' 5 The subcommittee found other
similar instances of questionable loans made to friends of union officials."1
The report also concludes that Hanley has placed friends and relatives
on the union's payroll as organizers: ". . . a significant number of these
'organizers' were hired on the basis of criteria other than proven ability
38. Id. at 19.
39. See, e.g., id. at 25-32 (recounting questionable loans made from union funds), 3541 (discussing increased organizing funds with diminished results), 41-47 (listing increased
salaries and expenditures for tangible property for benefit of union officials).
40. Id. at 21-22.
41. Id. at 23. See also id. at 49 ("Mergers are used by the International Union in my
opinion to gain control of the locals and get rid of dissidents.") (quoting Andrew Allen, a
Los Angeles local union official).
42. See id. at 24.
43. Id. at 25. The loan was allegedly for "a resort and development firm owned by...
Shenker." Id. Shenker also served as counsel to Teamsters President Jimmy Hoffa, id., and
is a "known associate of the late Kansas City organized crime leader, Nicholas Civella." Id.
at 31.
44. Id. at 26 n.78.
45. Id. at 27. HEREIU General Secretary Herman Leavitt contended before the
subcommittee that the loan to Shenker was sound. Id. at 31-32.
46. Id. at 27-30. One loan was characterized by a Florida real estate economist,
Charles Kimball, as follows: "I have never seen any loan as imprudent as the loan to Dutch
Inns. .

.

.No bank would have made the loan. Bank examiners would have shut them

down." Id. at 31.
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. "" Many had criminal records; several were associates of mobsters;
some held full-time jobs in addition to their jobs as HEREIU organizers.'8
Further, organizing expenses increased dramatically during Hanley's
presidency with some of those funds being used for non-union purposes.' 9
50
While expenses increased, organizing efforts did not.
Other abuses occurred as well: threats of physical violence made by
organizers against non-unionized workers; 51 sweetheart contracts with
hotels; 52 rigged union elections; 53 and the murder of Las Vegas local union
leader Al Bramlet. 5" The subcommittee suggested that HEREIU officers
improperly increased their salaries through confusing "regular" and
"special" per diem expenses or allowances. 55 It identified misuse of
57
tangible items owned by the union, 56 the padding of expense accounts,
.

and improper payments of legal and professional fees. 5 8 The subcommittee

found "a clear and present danger of camouflaging the illegal conversion of
union funds." 59
B.

HERE Local 54

Local 54 was of particular interest to the PSI because it is "thoroughly
intertwined with the casino industry and thus subject to the constant
pressure of infiltration by organized crime interests."6 0 The subcommittee
found evidence of corrupt union practices and ties between the union and
organized crime families. 61
47. Id. at 32.
48. Id. at 33, see also id. at 52 (PSI investigation revealed incumbent secretary
treasurer rescinded resignation allegedly to insure appointment of otherwise unqualified
secretary treasurer with ties to Los Angeles organized crime family).
49. Id. at 35. See also United States v. Gibson, 675 F.2d 825 (6th Cir.) (affirming
conviction of HEREIU General Secretary Treasurer for violation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 501 (c) for misuse of union property), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 979 (1982)..
50. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 36.
51. Id. at 37, 59.
52. Id. at 36, 50.
53. Id. at 38-39, 50-51.
54. Id. at 39-40.
55. Id. at 41-42. The government was unable to convince a jury in the trial of General
Secretary-Treasurer Gibson that this use of regular and special per diems violated the law.
Id. at 42. For other aspects of that case see Gibson,675 F.2d 825 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 972 (1982).
56. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 43-44. See also Gibson, 675 F.2d at 827-28.
57. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 46.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 45.
60. Id. at 63. See also N.Y. Times, supra note 10.
61. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 63-67.
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Prior to legalization of gambling in Atlantic City, predictions were
made that organized crime would dominate the casino industry."2 The
subcommittee, however, did not investigate the extent of organized crime's
involvement in Atlantic City, but its report leaves little question that a
substantial relationship exists.
One witness described a relationship between now-deceased Philadelphia mob chieftan Angelo Bruno, his Atlantic City associate Nicodemo
Scarfo, and HERE local official Ralph Natale. 63 Natale, "reportedly a
member of the Philadelphia organized crime family, controlled HERE
Local 170 in Camden, New Jersey, which was merged with Local 54 in
198 1.6, Hanley also employed Natale, convicted of arson and narcotics
trafficking, as an organizer for HEREIU from 1976 until 1979.65
Testimony by a high-ranking New Jersey State Police officer, an
expert on organized crime activity in New Jersey, linked Scarfo, former
Local 54 President Frank Gerace, Al Diadone, a former vice-president of
the local, and Hanley:
Scarfo's ability to influence this particular union has been largely facilitated through his close personal relationship with Frank Gerace ...
Gerace, in turn, has employed several individuals with criminal
backgrounds ...
In addition, Albert Diadone, vice president for local 54, is an admitted
associate of several Bruno crime family members. . . .In January 1981,
HEREIU General President Ed Hanley approved the merger of locals 33
and 54 with local 54 maintaining its position as the principal local. Prior to
the merger, Diadone served as vice president of local 33 and continued his
union affiliation with local 54 as an organizer and business agent. 6
Not only did union officials have ties to organized crime, but they
allegedly conducted business by resort to mob tactics. For example,
Diadone was convicted in 1984 for conspiracy to murder John McCullough, the head of the roofers' union in Atlantic City.67 The contract killing
was apparently committed because McCullough attempted to organize
62. See, e.g, Trouble in Las Vegas East, supra note 8.

63. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 63-64.
64. Id. at 64.
65. Id.

66. Id. at 64-65 (quoting Lt. Col. Justin Dintino, New Jersey State Police). See also
N.Y. Times, supra note 10. Gerace subsequently stepped down as union president due to the
various legal challenges to his authority. See Montaigne, Gerace Quits A.C. Union Post
Still Disputing State's Allegations, Phila. Inquirer, Dec. 11, 1984, § B, at 1.
67. Odom, Martorano,Diadone Are Found Guilty, Jury Decides Murder Case in

Three Hours, Phila. Inquirer, Aug. 1, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
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bartenders into his union.6 8 In addition, the subcommittee cited evidence
that Local 54 employee Frank Lentino and president Gerace were involved
in extortion. 6 9
Less specific allegations were made concerning other abuses in the
management of Local 54. For example, Gerace gave key union jobs to
mobster Scarfo's friends. 70 Without pointing to any specific abuse, New
Jersey State Police Lt. Colonel Justice Dintino alluded to misuse of
members' benefit funds: "Now, who is administering these funds? You
have in reality organized crime administering these funds, who you could
not trust with a nickel."' 71 Further, without alleging that Local 54 officials
have sold labor peace, New Jersey's Attorney General raised the concern
that the casino industry, grossing in excess of a half a million dollars a day,
72
is extremely vulnerable to a corrupt union.
C. Hanley, Local 54 and the Mismanagement of the Local'sDentalPlan
In many instances, the subcommittee relied on innuendoes and
speculation that HEREIU and local officials were engaged in labor
racketeering. 7 3 However, it did focus on specific allegations of mismanagement of the dental plans of Local 54 and Las Vegas Local 226 because of
the large size of those locals and their close association with organized
74
crime.
As background to explain the mismanagement of Local 54's dental
plan, the subcommittee described how organized crime typically skims
money from union benefit plans. In honest transactions, a service provider
enters a competitive bid to whomever is in charge of the particular fund."
When organized crime has influence over the union, the syndicate acts as a
conduit between the service providers and the union. The right contact can
68. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 65.
69. Id. at 65 n.223 (citing N.Y. Times, supra note 10, which described conspiracy
between Lentino, Gerace and Atlantic City Mayor Michael J. Matthews; Matthews
allegedly solicited bribes of approximately $125,000 to win mayoral race in exchange for
agreement to use office to assist local organized crime family).
70. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 66.
71. Id. at 67.
72. Id. (quote by New Jersey Attorney General Irwin Kimmelman cited in support).
73. See, e.g., id. at 66-67 (testimony by Lt. Col. Dintino and New Jersey Attorney
General Kimmelman, neither Lt. Col. Dintino, nor Attorney General Kimmelman
presented solid evidence to support their conclusion).
74. Id. at 103. "In an attempt to maintain a manageable scope, the Subcommittee
decided to focus upon dental coverage, specifically the dental plans associated with Atlantic
City Local 54 and Las Vegas Local 226. Since these locals are among HERE's largest and
have been closely associated with organized crime interests, PSI's focus was natural." Id.
75. Id. at 105.
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give the provider bid information in exchange for "fees. 7 6 A service
provider may also need the regional organized crime family's permission
before seeking a contract: "Payment of a percentage of plan contributions
is guaranteed to the crime family which, in turn, may provide the necessary
contacts. . .. "'
Skimming money from the fund is accomplished in a variety of ways.
The service provider may subcontract with various people, sometimes
duplicating services, and paying organized crime the extra fees thus
generated." Money is also kicked back through creation of corporations
without employees.7 Subcontractors generate the funds necessary for the
kickbacks, for example, by padding lists of union members served by the
service provider."' The subcommittee found that the same individuals,
often tied to organized crime, have dealt frequently with HERE local union
dental plans."' Further, some of those people have been indicted for
76. Id. Jimmy "The Weasel" Fratianno, "a high ranking organized crime figure who
became a government witness," offered a more detailed account of how organized crime
might participate in skimming union funds.
There are billions of dollars sitting around in trust funds set up by employers and
unions. All you do is find out who controls the money. Then you go see them and see
if you can work out a deal. You do something for them and they do something for
you. It works this way:
One, you can pay a union officer or a trustee some money up front. Two, you
can pay him a kickback when you get the contract. Three, you can do him a favor.
You can do a favor for a friend of his. Four, if that doesn't work, you can find out
who his superior is and put pressure on the man to come through. Five, if this doesn't
work you might try threats of physical violence. Six, finally, if all else fails, you
might break the guy's leg or worse. The technique is the same whether you are
selling a dental plan, a medical life insurance [sic], or whether you are out to get a
loan on highly favorable terms.
Id. at 106.
77. Id. at 106. The PSI Report cites the example of Angelo Commito's efforts to get
contracts for his Labor Health Plans, Inc.: "Commito's usual procedure for gaining health
contracts in various states was to first make contact with the local organized crime family.
In the work of La Cosa Nostra, this contact is necessary protocol for anyone who wishes to
do business in another family's territory." Id. See also United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d
102 (3d Cir. 1984) (defendant dentist convicted on RICO charge for payment of money to
union leaders to secure contract for police union dental plan), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1752
(1985).
78. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 107.
79. Id. at 108-09.
80. Id. at 108.
81. Id. at 106-09. Several individuals and companies were identified by the subcommittee: e.g., id. at 107-08, (Dr. Joel Sokol, northern New Jersey); 106-07 (Angelo
Commito, owner of Labor Health Plans, Inc., in the Philadelphia area); 109 (Paul A. Fosco,
registered agent of Consultants and Administrators, Inc., and Chicago La Cosa Nostra
figure Al Pilotto, working together in Miami and Las Vegas).
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participation in kickback schemes.8 9 The subcommittee found that Local
54's dental plan was typical in its mismanagement and corruption. It
focused on Lawrence Smith's role in the management of the plan: "...
Smith, who is neither a plan administrator, attorney, trustee, nor dentist,
has controlled this plan almost since its inception and has done so on behalf
of Philadelphia organized crime interests." 8
Smith apparently controls numerous union benefit plans in southern
New Jersey. 8 ' A former "hit man" turned federal informant testified that
one of Smith's companies received consultant fees for his role in the various
plans. In turn, Smith gave money directly to Angelo Bruno and to Ralph
Natale for distribution to Bruno.8 5 The informant also acted as a conduit
between Natale and Frank Sindone, a member of the Bruno family. 86 The
subcommittee observed that $150,000 were missing from plan contributions and inferred that those funds have been diverted to organized crime.8 7
The report detailed the structure of the local's dental plan. In 1975,
Local 54's plan was merged into the international fund, part of Hanley's
accretion of power and influence over the local unions.8 8 Services were
provided to Local 54 by the Health Corporation of America (HCA) with
funds paid from employer contributions to William L. Meyers, Inc., the
fund administrator.8 9 From the plan funds, William L. Meyers, Inc.,
deducted its administrative fee; the remaining money went to HCA. HCA,
in turn, took a substantial fee, a full 25% of the money which it received
from Meyers, Inc., leaving only about 70% of contributions to pay the
dentists who actually delivered the services.9 0
HCA paid one of Smith's companies a substantial part of its fee for
'marketing assistance,' 'computer services,' and other services.
...91
82. Id. at 109-10. Joseph Hauser was one of three frequent providers of insurance to
unions. Id. at 109. Hauser pled guilty to federal charges arising out of one scheme to skim
substantial sums from the Teamsters' health, welfare and pension plans, and subsequently
became the government's "con-man" in its BRILAB investigation. United States v.
Marcello, 537 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. La. 1982), affd sub nom. United States v. Roemer, 703
F.2d 805 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 935 (1983).
83. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 110-11.
84. Id. at 111. Smith was acquitted recently of charges of fraud in insurance sales to a
union by a jury verdict in a New Jersey federal district court. Weiner, Cherry Hill
Businessman Acquitted of Defrauding Labor Union Funds, Phila. Inquirer, Mar. 9, 1985,

§ B, at 1.
85. PSI Report, supra note 7, at I11.
86. Id.
87. Id.

88. Id. at 93-101.
89. Id. at 112.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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The subcommittee asserted, however, that Smith's company Rittenhouse
'92
Consulting Enterprises, Inc., provided "no tangible work product.
According to a former HCA official, Rittenhouse provided intangible
93
benefits.
The subcommittee left little doubt about its belief that funds were
funnelled through HCA and Rittenhouse to organized crime figures:
Within the Local 54 plan, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see the
worth being received from Rittenhouse and to a lesser extent, HCA ...
[Tihe administrative services for Local 54's plan "could be rendered at a
fraction of the payments retained by HCA," and the payments to
Rittenhouse are- "totally unwarranted."
Why is Larry Smith involved at all in the Local 54 plan? The answer to
this question appears to revolve around Smith's "contacts" with both union
officials and organized crime figures, but the Subcommittee has been
thwarted by the refusals of [HCA President Joseph] Cusumano, Smith,
and Gerace to respond to questioning. All have asserted their Fifth
Amendment privilege.94
Although there has been some change of personnel dealing with Local
54's dental plan, questionable practices have continued. Most recently, for
example, HCA attempted to negotiate an agreement with Drs. Daniel
Proper and Frank Pettisani to take over the Local 54 dental plan. 95 A
requirement of the agreement was that the dentists pay Smith a monthly
fee for computer services. In addition, Dr. Proper was to pay Smith
$50,000 a year for three years as a "finder's fee" for the plan.96
When arrangements with Proper fell through, Dr. Pettisani became
the plan's chief provider. 97 While Pettisani is not obligated to pay a finder's
92. Id. at 113.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 113-15.
95. Id. at 118. Providers of services can be indicted under RICO for improper
payments for a union contract. See United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1752 (1985). The PSI suggests in its report, however, that Drs.
Proper and Pettisani had no reason to believe that the fees designated for Smith were for
other than bona fide services. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 119. If individuals like the
dentists were aware of the impropriety of such payments, interesting issues would arise
whether RICO contains a mens rea requirement and whether it is met merely by showing
that the individual had the intent to commit the predicate offense or by proving the
additional intent to conduct the affairs of the enterprise. This issue has been discussed
elsewhere. See, e.g., Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 382-83 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Tarlow, RICO Revisited]; Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the
Prosecutor'sNursery, 49 FORD. L. REV. 164, 180-83 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Tarlow,

RICO].
96. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 119.
97. Id.
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fee, he has agreed to pay Smith's computer company the same $15,000
monthly fee for computer services. The subcommittee suggested that this
fee was duplicative and, most likely, was being paid to organized crime
figures. 98 The subcommittee felt frustrated in efforts to determine exactly
how the plan was administered, but it left no doubt that Local 54 President
Gerace had that information. Gerace, however, refused to disclose the
information because it would probably lead directly from the dental plan
through Smith and HCA's Cusumano to Nicodemo Scarfo. 9
The subcommittee report evidences a pattern of racketeering within
HEREIU and Local 54. While the subcommittee did not have to allege or
to establish all of the essential elements of various crimes, it indicated that
large sums of money were being siphoned from union benefit funds to
organized crime families, 100 that union officials resorted to extortion and
murder to accomplish their goal of control over local unions, 10 1 and that
union funds have been squandered by hiring racketeering cronies and
misusing union funds.1 02 Subsequent sections of this Article discuss
specific provisions of federal law intended to protect the public as well as
union rank and file members from such corrupt practices.

II.

THE MCCLELLAN HEARINGS

The McClellan hearings, held during the 1950's, were probably best
known as the source of enmity between Teamster boss Jimmy Hoffa and
then-counsel to the Senate Select Committee, Robert F. Kennedy.10 3 The
hearings, however, were not aimed solely at the Teamsters; they also
focused on widespread union corruption affecting several industries,' 0 '
including the hotel and restaurant industry. Those hearings led to several
statutory reforms.' Senator McClellan's crowning legislation was the
98. Id.
99. Id. at 120-21. See also id.at 141-43 (discussing use of fifth amendment by
witnesses).
100. See supra notes 42-50, 73-99 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 66, 70 and accompanying text.
103. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 5, at 137-69.

104. See MCCLELLAN, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE
LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, S. REP. No.621, SECOND INTERIM REPORT, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 108 (1959) [hereinafter cited as SECOND INTERIM REPORT]. See also Blakey &
Goldstock, supra note 6, at 341 (listing unions found to be corrupt by McCellan
Committee).
105. See, e.g., The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Procedure Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 401-531, 501 (1975) (fiduciary responsibility of officers of labor organization).
See also Morrissey v. Curran, 650 F.2d 1267, 1272-73 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Congress [was]
anxious to curb the wide-scale corruption among union officials found by the McClellan
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controversial RICO statute,' which was in large part a product of the
earlier McClellan hearings into labor racketeering." 7 That fact has been
somewhat obscured by the use of RICO by the government in cases which
involve neither organized crime nor infiltration of legitimate businesses or
unions.10 8
While acting to purge the union movement of Communist influence,10 9 Congress faced what it cohsidered to be another sinister menace to
organized labor, domination by the criminal syndicate.1 10 For example,
many of those arrested during the raid on the 1957 "gangland meeting" in
Apalachin, New York, were involved in labor management relations."1
Domination of unions by organized crime raises several concerns: the
Committee, which had identified the need for legislation .... ").
106. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp. 1985). The controversy has been fueled
by two prominent commentators on RICO who have engaged in a battle of footnotes. See,
e.g., Tarlow, RICO Revisited, supra note 95, at 294-95 (suggesting that Professor Blakey
has "uncritically applaud [ed] each decision that expands the scope of RICO"); Blakey &
Gettings, supra note 26, at 1012-13, 1012 n.13 (implying that attorney Tarlow has not
taken "trouble to understand" RICO). Much of the controversy relates to the proper scope
of RICO. Probably intended by Congress to apply only to infiltration of legitimate
enterprises by organized crime, courts have affirmed convictions involving local criminal
activity committed by members of entirely illegal enterprises having no connection with
organized crime. See Tarlow, RICO Revisited, supra note 95, at 296-302.
107. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 6, at 341, 348-49. In 1956, Senator McClellan
authorized Robert Kennedy, then counsel for the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, to make "a preliminary check into labor racketeering." A. SCHLESINGER,
supranote 5, at 138. In early 1957, the Senate formed McClellan's Committee by selecting
four members from the PSI and four members from the Senate Labor Committee. Id. at
143-44. While investigating labor racketeering generally, the Committee focused on the
Teamsters in particular, first on Teamsters President Dave Beck, id. at 147-50, and later on
Jimmy Hoffa, id. at 155-60, 162-69. The investigations contributed to the successful
conviction of Beck for theft of union funds and income tax evasion. Id. at 148-49. The
Committee's role in Beck's downfall "made the Rackets Committee overnight a national
phenomenon." Id. at 149. Subsequently, the Committee conducted hearings investigating
Hoffa's racketeering activities. Id. at 155-69. See infra notes 109-42 and accompanying
text for a discussion of some of the abuses identified by the Committee.
108. See Tarlow, RICO Revisited, supra note 95, at 298-99 (suggesting that RICO
has been used against an "astonishing variety" of defendants "who do not appear to be the
intended targets of the legislation").
109. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Procedure Act, 29 U.S.C.
504.
110. See FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE
LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, S. REP. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 487-511 (1960)

[hereinafter cited as

FINAL REPORT].
11. Id. at 487. That meeting has often been cited as evidence of the existence of the

Mafia's national counsel, a conclusion which was debunked in Hawkins, supra note 2, at
180-83, where the author asserted that "[o]ne thing is certain: the information available
about Apalachin provides no serious evidence that 'a single national crime syndicate'
dominates organized crime in America; nor does it make this seem probable." Id. at 183.
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public bears the cost of a tribute paid to organized crime and is also
inconvenienced by illegal strikes; rank and file members lose the right to
democratic representation; legitimate honest companies are forced out of
business if they do not accede to corrupt union demands; and honest trade
unions are harmed by loss of public trust in the integrity of collective
bargaining.' 12 This section discusses some of the labor abuses identified by
the McClellan committee that led to the enactment of RICO.
While the hearings considered various unions, Jimmy Hoffa's management of the Teamsters was its favorite target."" Indeed, the Senate
Select Committee observed:
"The power of the Teamsters Union president is so extraordinary that
the committee finds the fact that this power is now lodged in the hands of a
man such as Hoffa tragic for the Teamsters Union and dangerous for the
country at large."
During 1958, the committee held an additional 7 weeks of hearings
into the activities of Hoffa and the Teamsters. Nothing in these hearings
has in any way altered the committee's previously announced views on the
leadership and direction of the Nation's largest union. In fact, the 1958
hearings produced testimony of an even more sordid nature than that of the
1
previous year.' '
The committee identified diverse racketeering activity by Hoffa.
Despite Hoffa's frequent boasts about bettering the working conditions for
union members, the committee reported instances where "Hoffa . . .
permitted his close associates to sign contracts. . . which are disgracefully
low and in some cases even lower than the national minimum
wage. . . . "115 Hoffa and his friends linked to organized crime benefitted
from such sell-outs of Teamster members by their participation in
sweetheart contracts with management." 6 The committee documented
instances where strikes were settled favorably to management only after
cash payments were made "for the purpose of influencing Hoffa to
7
intercede" in a particular dispute.1
112. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 6, at 342. See also SECOND INTERIM REPORT,
supra note 104, at 110 ("because of the tremendous economic power of the Teamsters, it
will place the underworld in a position to dominate American economic life. .. ").
113. See, e.g.. SECOND INTERIM REPORT, supra note 104, at 108-208; FINAL REPORT,
supra note 110, at 723-31.
114. SECOND INTERIM REPORT, supra note 104, at 108; see also FINAL REPORT,
supra note 110, at 723-24.
115. SECOND INTERIM REPORT, supra note 104, at 109.
116. FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 728. See also SECOND INTERIM REPORT,
supra note 104, at 109, 120.

117.

FINAL REPORT,

supra note 110, at 723-25.
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Prior to ascending to the Teamster presidency, Hoffa promised the
Senate committee that he would rid the union of domination by racketeers. 118 The committee found not only that Hoffa failed to do so, but also
that he "promoted criminal and racketeering elements within the Teamsters." 11 9 Indeed, Hoffa was obligated to organized crime because of its
1 20
assistance in his ascension to power.
Having attained power, Hoffa was able to repay his friends and to
enrich himself through a variety of corrupt practices: he "extended special
deals to employers with whom he had special business and social ties. 12 1
Hoffa not only sold out 1 22 the union to benefit those companies but also
"engaged in strikebreaking"'1 28 and other questionable practices to destroy
12 4
opponents within the Teamsters and to aggrandize his own power.
Then, as now, the committee found that a powerful and corrupt union
president can raid the union's treasury. Hoffa assisted allies by making
benefit funds available under favorable terms, while he placed himself in a
118. Id. at 130, 723-24.
119. Id. at 130.
120. Id. at 728-29. See also A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 5, at 164-66, discussing the
reputation of some of Hoffa's mob-friends, including "Joey" Gallo, "Joey" Glimco,
Salvatore Giancana, and "Tony" Provenzano. Hoffa's use of the mob in his ascension to
power has been characterized as follows:
As Kennedy saw it, Hoffa had begun by hiring hoods as business agents in
Detroit because he needed strong-arm men. Once in, he allowed them to exploit
workers and employers. Then they told colleagues in other cities that Hoffa was a
"right guy" and they should let him in. "Hoffa wants ex-convicts, I think," Kennedy
told Martin,
because, first, he does a favor for them and they'll stick by him; second, by
hiring an ex-convict he's doing a favor for another gangster, so then the
gangster will do Hoffa a favor; and third, he uses them to move in on a city. To
get into Chicago he needed the okay of Joey Glimco and Paul Dorfman, and he
gave Dorfman the Teamsters' insurance business. To get into Philadelphia he
used Shorty Feldman. . . . To get into New York he was using Johnny Dio.
He was becoming a vital link between the underworld and respectable society.
Kennedy was learning from testimony what Hoffa had learned from life - that
organized crime was a great unseen power.
1d. at 166-67.
121. FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 725, 728.
122. Hoffa sold out the union, for example, by "repeatedly . . .entering into a number
of business relationships with employers with whom his union negotiated. . . ." Id. at 723.
The Committee described instances where Hoffa forced union members to accept
unfavorable conditions in contravention of existing contracts, id. at 725-26; and where
Hoffa allowed "his close associates to sign contracts ... which [were] disgracefully low
and in some cases even lower than the national minimum wage ....
" SECOND INTERIM
REPORT, supra note 104, at 109.
123. Apparently Hoffa's supporters would destroy Teamsters' local strike efforts in
order to "liquidate" a Hoffa foe. FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 726.
124. Id. at 567, 726, 729.
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position to gain personally from such transactions. 25 He placed his
"henchmen" on the payroll and allowed them "lush salaries and liberal
expenses."'12 He was also able to place them on the payroll of, for example,
publishing companies where they did not work in exchange for labor
peace.' The committee also suggested that Hoffa sanctioned the use of
violence and extortion.

28

The committee's description of abuses in one local is a summary of
racketeering activity open to corrupt officials:
In local 560. . . the top officials arrogantly [were] levying tribute upon
employers who reluctantly paid to avoid labor trouble. Here, again, is the
example of entrenched gangsterism that never lets go, as evidenced by the
announced intention of the aging international vice president, John Conlin,
one of those accused of extortion, to see to it that he is successed in the
international office by Anthony "Tony Pro" Provenzano, also accused for
forcing employers to pay handsomely for labor peace. Provenzano, for
years identified with major criminals in the New York-New Jersey area, is
a recognized Hoffa henchman. .

.

.[L]ocal 560's officers considered the

union treasury as a private preserve into which they dipped heavily for
annual salaries of $19,500 each and new Cadillac automobiles. The record
shows that 75 to 86 percent of total income of the 10,000-member union in
1957 and 1958 went for salaries and expenses and to create vested rights for
them in a "defense pension fund."' 12 9
In addition to the extensive focus on Hoffa, the committee found
similar abuses in other unions and industries. For example, it observed that
"[d]uring the past two decades, almost every infamous criminal in
America has held interest in some segment of coin machine operations.
They have posed as owners and as union leaders. Racketeers have shown an
increasing inclination to assume the role of labor leaders .... "1130 Other
125. Id. at 727-28.
126. FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 728.
127. Id.See also id. at 128-30 (following investigation of extent of infiltration in both
labor and management of New York newspaper and magazine wholesale distribution
business, committee concluded that "[iut
was apparent ...that the unaccounted funds [in
the books and records of the wholesale distributors] were in fact slush funds used to bribe
officials of the Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union of New York and vicinity").
128. Id. at 567. For example, Hoffa "approved and sanctioned [Joseph P. Glimco] as a
union leader, condoning his destruction ofdemocracy in local 777 and his exploitation of the
membership." Id. Glimco's activity included extorting money both from employers and
union officers. Id. at 564-65. He used "goon's and thugs. . . to stamp out by violence any
movement toward honest trade unionism." Id. at 566. His extensive record included arrests
for murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and extortion. Id. at 567.
129. Id. at 729.
130. Id. at 856.
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industries were identified as having ties to underworld figures. 13 1

Once organized crime gained control of a union, various abuses
followed. Hoodlums and ex-convicts were hired by the union or by
employers in various roles.132 Whatever they were allegedly hired for
seemed less important than actual job performance: goon squads were used
for shakedowns, extortion, embezzlement, and intimidation.1 33 Employment was secured for no-shows to create money for kickbacks to corrupt
union officials who in turn shared their wealth with the criminal syndicate."" Corrupt unions sold labor peace,13 5 participated in rigged bidding
schemes,13 6 sanctioned arson and violence,1 37 and misused benefit funds.' 3 8
Money was skimmed from those funds through loans, 3 9 finder's fees,' 4 0
accounting fees,' " and excessive commissions. 142
131. See, e.g., SECOND INTERIM REPORT, supra note 104, at 671-74 (Chicago
restaurant industry); FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 95 (sheet metal industry); FINAL
REPORT, supra note 10, at 96 (newspaper industry).
132. SECOND INTERIM REPORT, supra note 104, at 513. See also FINAL REPORT,
supra note 110, at 95-96 (describing conflict regarding alleged payoffs to Chigago sheet
metal contractors in one case totalling $27,000).
133. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 69-96. The following examples of
gangsterism were reported: in one instance, while neither the employer nor the employees

wanted Teamster representation of the employees, the Teamsters enforced a secondary
boycott by violence and destruction, leading to the closing of the employer's business, id. at

69; elsewhere, after Teamsters lost an NLRB election, the union resorted to "[h]ired
strong-arm men [who] harried the employees . . . with weapons up to and including
firearms [and] the use of stolen dynamite in bombings and attempted bombings," id. at 70;

the committee also identified various acts of extortion of money, for example, "for the mere
privilege of acquiring union shop recognition," id. at 71, or "to 'alleviate' interference with
the installation of [a manufacturer's] equipment in various parts of the country," id. at 7172, or to get union workers to handle a manufacturer's product. Id. at 72. See alsoSECOND
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 104, at 672. The committee found that "mobster-dominated

locals" of the Chicago area restaurant employees union were merely "a cloak of legitimacy
• . . [for] a pure extortion racket." Id. The principal qualification of the union's business
agents was their "police record of sufficiently impressive length and a connection, real or
implied, with the crime of homicide or other offenses synonymous with violence." Id..
134. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 497-98. See also SECOND INTERIM
REPORT, supra note 104, at 206 (Michigan Conference of Teamsters granted health and
welfare insurance contract to higher bidder).
135. FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 857.
136. Id. at 80-95.
137. See, e.g., id. at 7-8, 34-38.
138. Id. at 497-98.
139. Id. at 727.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 568-69, 728.
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AND CORRUPT UNION PRACTICES

The McClellan bearings produced a number of reforms.' 3 While not
its sole aim,"' the RICO statute was designed to combat corrupt union
practices. 1"5 The PSI report identified systematic labor racketeering by
HEREIU and HERE local union officials.1 6 Curiously, the report did not
mention the applicability of RICO to such practices or the successful use of
RICO to combat labor racketeering.14 7 This section analyzes some of
RICO's provisions and suggests their applicability to the facts developed in
the PSI report.
RICO authorizes "the imposition of enhanced criminal penalties and
new civil sanctions to provide new legal remedies for all types of organized
criminal behavior, that is, enterprise criminality ..

."'l RICO is pri-

marily remedial in that it does not criminalize conduct not already
prohibited under state or federal law.' 9 It is not, however, merely a
punishment enhancement statute. As observed by one court, "the gravamen of a RICO offense is the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering." 150
Unlike the traditional criminal law, RICO focuses on relationships.
The "criminal law was concerned with the commission of specific illegal
acts by named individuals.'' 5 Group membership and an individual's
143. See, e.g., The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Procedure Act, 29
U.S.C. § 401-531, 501 (1975).
144. The express purpose was "to seek eradication of organized crime in the United
States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing
new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with
the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." Organized Crime Control
Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970).
145. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (1984
& Supp. 1985).
146. See supra notes 22-99 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 820 (1981).
148. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 26, at 1013-14.
149. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
150. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 906 (1982) (Fifth Circuit rejected defendant's double jeopardy argument that he
could not be convicted both of a RICO conspiracy and of a continuing series of narcotics
violations; the court reasoned that a RICO count is separate from the substantive offenses
because RICO penalized the conduct of the enterprise through criminal activity).
151. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 6, at 347. See also United States v. Elliott, 571
F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (court held that RICO's drafters
adopted new conspiracy doctrine based on "enterprise" concept; thus, defendants were
liable for conspiracy to conduct affairs of enterprise even though they were unaware of
existence of some of their co-defendants and of diverse criminal activity in which those codefendants engaged).
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commission of similar crimes are generally inadmissible. 5 ' RICO begins
with the realization that organized crime functions through group membership and the commission of various crimes by group members. 53
A person may violate RICO in several ways. Section 1962(a) makes
unlawful the investment of funds "derived . . . from a pattern of
racketeering activity" in an enterprise. 5 Section 1962(b) makes unlawful
55
a takeover of an enterprise "through a pattern of racketeering activity.'

The most frequently used provision of the act, section 1962(c), makes it
unlawful to conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise "through a

pattern of racketeering activity."'

56

Finally, section 1962(d) makes it

unlawful to conspire to violate RICO's substantive provisions. 5
This Article focuses on section 1962(c). Section 1962(a) will generally be inapplicable in the labor context and has been used infrequently in
labor cases. 5 8 Section 1962(b) has clearapplication to the labor context,
but most prosecutions have resulted after the union has been taken over and
have been based on 1962(c). 159 RICO conspiracies have been discussed
extensively and present substantially the same issues in the labor field as
elsewhere. 160
152. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 6, at 347-48.
153. Id. at 348.

154. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). This section states in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful
for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
racketeering activity. . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or
the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce," Id.
155. Id. § 1962(b). "It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of
racketeering activity . . . to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or
control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce." Id. A "pattern of racketeering activity" is not defined in the statute per
se, but a "pattern of racketeering activity requires at least two acts of racketeering activity,
one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred
within ten years . . . after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." Id. §
1961(5).
156. Id. § 1962(c). "It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity ...." Id.
157. Id. § 1962(d). "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section." Id.
158. That section has been used infrequently in all contexts. See Tarlow, RICO
Revisited, supra note 95, at 320-23. But see Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 6, at 355-57
(discussing application of section 1962(a) to labor racketeering).
159. See Tarlow, RICO Revisited, supra note 95, at 323-24; Blakey & Goldstock,
supra note 6, at 358-60.
160. See, e.g., Holderman, Reconciling RICO's Conspiracyand "Group"Enterprise
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The Appropriate Enterprise

Because of the perception that organized crime works through group
activity, the "enterprise" concept is the most important essential element
common to all RICO violations. The Act is designed to reach beyond
individuals who commit the various predicate acts to "the power source
behind the scheme or corruption."1 ' It does so by making criminally liable
all participants in the relevant enterprise. Obviously, Congress cannot
criminalize mere association of an individual with an enterprise. 6 RICO
avoids that result because it also requires that an individual either
participate directly in the affairs of the enterprise by committing the
predicate acts or by agreeing to conduct its affairs through the commission
of predicate acts. 163
165
16 4
The concept has generated extensive litigation and controversy.
For example, until the Supreme Court resolved the issue in United States v.
Turkette,1 " federal courts were divided on whether RICO applied only to
legitimate businesses or whether it extended to associations whose only
function was the commission of illegal activity.16 7 By contrast, RICO's
Concepts with Traditional Conspiracy Doctrine, 52 U. CINN. L. REV. 385 (1983); Tarlow,
RICO Revisited, supra note 95, at 383-98.
161. Magarity, RICO Investigations: A Case Study, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 367, 369
n. 11 (1980). See also United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1350 n. 109 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 941 (1984).
162. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (punishing person for
status violates eighth amendment); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (statute
unconstitutionally vague in that person must guess whether act applies to him).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1332 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 941 (1984); United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 829 (1982).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981); United States v. Ivic,
700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1040 (1982); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983); United States v. DeRosa, 670 F.2d 889 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1014 (1982); United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982).
165. See, e.g., Tarlow, RICO Revisited, supra note 95, at 324-46; Blakey & Gettings,
supra note 26, at 1025-29 n.91.
166. 452 U.S. 576,578-80 (1981). The indictment charged that a group of individuals
were "associated in fact for the purpose of trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous
drugs," and for committing an assortment of other crimes. Id. at 579. The Supreme Court
held that RICO applies to the infiltration of wholly illegal as well as legitimate businesses.
Id. at 580-93.
167. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (Ist Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S.
576 (1981); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 912 (1981). These cases held that RICO was intended to prohibit only infiltration and
operation of legitimate enterprises through a pattern of racketeering, not operation of an
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application to corrupt unions has never been seriously debated; section
1961(4) includes "any union" among RICO "enterprises," 16 8 a provision
which easily withstood a challenge that it was unconstitutionally vague. "9
In the case under analysis, the only problem posed by the enterprise
element is the choice of the appropriate enterprise. While the government
may not plead a "totally amorphous and intangible" entity,170 it does have
wide latitude in its theory of the relevant enterprise. 17 Once it pleads a
specific enterprise in the indictment, however, it must prove the entity at

trial. "'
enterprise connected, in effect, only by the commission ofvarious crimes. Those cases relied
on emphasis in the legislative history on illicit take-over of legitimate business by organized
crime. See, e.g., Turkette, 632 F.2d at 899-905. Further, there was reliance on canons o
construction favoring narrow construction of criminal statutes. See, e.g., Anderson, 626
F.2d at 1365-66 n. 11. Finally, including an illegal enterprise based on a group of individuals
associated in fact would fail to draw a distinction between two distinct essential elements,
the enterprise element and the requirement of a pattern of racketeering activity. See, e.g.,
Sutton, 605 F.2d at 265-66.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
169. United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1050 (1976). The indictment charged the defendants, including members of a Teamsters'
local, with a conspiracy, between 1968 and 1972, to conduct an enterprise through a
"pattern of racketeering by intimidation and forcing meat packers to contract" with a
particular unloading company. Id. at 355. The court held, inter alia,that the statute was
not vague, and any ambiguity was cured by defining statutory terms in section 1961.

Id. at

364.
170. United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 n. 17 (E.D. Pa.) (court rejected
contention of defendant, president judge of Philadelphia traffic court, that court was not
sufficient enterprise for purposes of RICO), aff'd mem., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980).
171. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1333-35 (5th Cir. 1983). In Cauble the
defendant, a wealthy Texas businessman, was indicted for, among other crimes, conducting
the affairs of Cauble Enterprises, through a pattern of racketeering activity. He and his
associates imported and distributed over 147,000 pounds of marijuana from 1976 through
1978. Id at 1329. The Fifth Circuit rejected Cauble's contention that, at most, the evidence
showed that he and other individuals associated in fact were the relevant enterprise, not
Cauble Enterprises. Id. at 1333-34.
172. United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1110 (1983). In Lemm charges arose out of an insurance fraud scheme involving seventeen
arson fires in five states over a three year period. Id. at 1196. The court observed that
because the government failed to allege one defendant's public adjustment business as the
relevant enterprise, and because the theory was not presented to the jury, the convictions
could not be sustained on that basis. Id. at 1206. Instead, the court found evidence sufficient
to establish existence of an illegal conspiracy. Id. See also United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d
387 (2d Cir. 1979) (defendant, convicted of various charges arising out of a scheme to
defraud the United States in connection with the administration of Medicaid and Medicare
programs; court found that government had pleaded and proved the same enterprise), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977)
(failure to plead an alternative enterprise that had an impact on interstate commerce
prevented court from considering that theory to sustain defendants' RICO conviction), cert.
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The PSI report suggests that the government might frame a sweeping
indictment focusing on the take-over and conduct of HEREIU through a
pattern of racketeering. Such an indictment might name General President Hanley and other international officials, HERE local officials, and
various organized crime figures. Analysis of that potential prosecution is
beyond the scope of this Article. A more manageable prosecution would
focus on the corrupt conduct of the affairs of Local 54. Once the enterprise
is identified as Local 54, additional questions arise: (1) does a local union
have an impact on interstate commerce? (2) was there a sufficient nexus
between the conduct of the union and the pattern of racketeering? (3) what
is the appropriate pattern of racketeering?
B.

Interstate Commerce

The government must prove that there has been an effect on interstate
commerce to establish a RICO offense. 7 The government has had little
difficulty in meeting that burden. Courts have generally held that the
government must prove only that the enterprise engaged in or had an
"affect" on interstate commerce, not that the racketeering activity had an
"impact" on interstate commerce. 1 74 For example, if an officer of an
interstate cable company committed purely local acts of bribery of a public
official, the government could meet its burden of proof by showing that the
enterprise was engaged in interstate commerce.1' That is, the act of
bribery may have no impact at all on interstate commerce; the participants
may have avoided use of the mails or interstate phone wires, but the
statutory requirement is met because the enterprise affected interstate
commerce. That result comports with the express language of the
17 1
statute.
Courts have found an effect on interstate commerce based on minimal
denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
173. 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). See also Nerone, 563 F.2d at 850-52.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 656 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1981) (defendant, a
bookmaker in Baltimore, together with, inter alia, former Baltimore police officer
attempted to bribe city police to provide protection; court held evidence sufficient to meet
interstate commerce element because supplies used in bookmaking operation had traveled
in interstate commerce); United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5 (4th Cir. 1980) (defendant,
a state prosecuting attorney, convicted of RICO and various other offenses arising out of
efforts to prevent prosecution of illegal gambling activities; court found sufficient impact on
interstate commerce because interstate calls were regularly placed from his house; supplies
and materials originating outside of West Virginia were used in the office, and persons not
residents of the state were involved in the office's investigations).
175. See Tarlow, RICO, supra note 95, at 237-39.
176. RICO encompasses "any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
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impact of the enterprise on interstate commerce. For example, the Seventh
Circuit suggested that a corporation operating a trailer park had a
sufficient impact because mobile homes that were brought into the park
were manufactured out of state.17 7 The BRILAB case illustrates a more
extreme example.' 7 8 There, the interstate commerce element was met by
use of the telephone to place an out-of-state call and the use of the mails to
send a single letter. The use of the mails seemed a singularly inappropriate
basis for federal jurisdiction because one of the defendants was persuaded
by a government operative to have the letter retyped and mailed, rather
7
than hand delivered.'1
At this late date, it would seem beyond debate that even a local union
is "engaged in, or [that its] activities . . .affect, interstate or foreign
commerce .. ."'1 In addition to the involvement of the federal government in union activity generally, in the case under analysis it would appear
that, like the defendants in United States v. Marcello,18 ' the various
participants had recourse to the mails and to interstate telephone facilities
in carrying out their various schemes to siphon money from the Local 54
dental plan.' 8 '
177. United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 850-52 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 951 (1978). The court held, however, that because the prosecution had relied on a
different enterprise, evidence of the trailer park's impact on interstate commerce could not
sustain the defendants' convictions for RICO and related gambling violations. Id. at 85152.
178. United States v. Marcello, 537 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. La. 1982), affd sub nom.
United States v. Roemer, 703 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 341 (1983). The
term BRILAB derived from the original purpose of the investigation, to uncover bribery of
labor leaders in exchange for insurance contracts. Marcello, 508 F. Supp. at 589 (pretrial
motions to dismiss and suppress evidence).
179. Marcello, 537 F. Supp. at 1374-75. Defendants Carlos Marcello, reputed Mafia
boss in New Orleans and Charles Roemer, Louisiana Commissioner of Administration,
were convicted of conspiring to violate RICO. The purpose of the conspiracy was "to
associate together in fact as an enterprise for the purpose of obtaining the state employees
insurance contract" through various acts of bribery. Id. at 1368. Their convictions were
affirmed despite several contentions, including a claim that the government had artificially
created federal jurisdiction. Id. at 1369-77. Courts have not been sympathetic to a claim of
manufactured subject matter jurisdiction. See Tarlow, RICO Revisited, supra note 95, at
380-82.
180. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). See, e.g., NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939). In
enacting the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-158 (1973 & Supp. 1974 &
Supp. 1985), Congress intended to exercise full constitutional authority based on the
commerce clause, to prevent or control unfair labor practices because they provoke strikes
which, in turn, affect commerce. Fainblatt,306 U.S. at 607.
181. 537 F. Supp. 1364.
182. See PSI Report, supra note 7, at 110-21 (citing contact between Local 54
members in New Jersey with Philadelphia organized crime figures; contact between HCA,
Local 54 and fund administrator William Meyers, Inc. of Naperville, Illinois; contact

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

C.

[Vol. 16:671

The Nexus Between the Patternof Racketeering and the Enterprise

The PSI report evidences a wide range of crimes allegedly committed
by several individuals associated with Local 54. For example, former vicepresident Al Diadone has been convicted for conspiracy to murder John
McCullough, the head of the Roofers' Union, who attempted to organize
bartenders away from Local 54.183 The report cites evidence that Local
54's president and some of his underlings were engaged in extortion1 8' and
may have sold labor peace to casino owners. 185 It also indicates that various
individuals, including members of the Philadelphia area organized crime
family were embezzling money from the benefit plans. 86 Without more,
however, commission of several crimes may be insufficient to establish a
RICO violation.
RICO was not designed to criminalize sporadic criminal activity; 8 7
nor was it intended to criminalize racketeering activity itself.' 88 That is,
between Chicago area dentists and Local 54 officials). That activity itself might constitute
predicate acts under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1984 & Supp. 1985). See also 18
U.S.C. § 1952A (Supp. 1985) (jurisdiction over activities using interstate commerce
facilities and involving "commission of murder for-hire"); 18 U.S.C. § 1952B (Supp. 1985)
(jurisdiction over activities using interstate commerce facilities and involving "violent
crimes in aid of racketeering activity").
183. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 65. See also supra note 67.
184. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 65 n.223. Local President Gerace and Frank
Lentino allegedly conspired with former Atlantic City Mayor Michael Matthews to use his
office to assist the local organized crime family whenever possible. Id.
185. Id. at 67. Without identifying specific instances of the sale of labor peace, the
New Jersey Attorney General strongly suggested that it was taking place: "How much is it
worth to keep a business that grosses between $500,000 and $1 million a day free from
strike? A corrupt union could extort outright payments or use its power of persuasion to
dictate what firms get the lucrative ancillary service contracts within the casino industry."

Id.
186. Id. at 64-67. The evidence established domination of the union by figures directly
in contact and under the influence of Nicodemo Scarfo, successor to Angelo Bruno as the
head of the Philadelphia crime family. It also indicated that organized crime figures are
interested in unions such as Local 54 because of the opportunity to administer benefit funds
corruptly. Id.
187. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 26, at 1029-30. In enacting RICO, Congress
was concerned primarily with limiting the impact of organized crime on legitimate
businesses. See McClellan, supranote 20, at 57 (RICO is "carefully drafted ... to attack
and to mitigate the effects of racketeer infiltration of legitimate organizations affecting
interstate commerce ..
"). As observed by the Senate Judiciary Committee, "[t]he
target of Title IX is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business
normally requires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activity
to be effective." RICO SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 158.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 941 (1984). "The mere fact that a defendant works for a legitimate enterprise and
commits racketeering acts while on the business premises does not establish that the affairs
of the enterprise have been conducted 'through' a pattern of racketeering activity." Id. at
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"the gravamen of a RICO offense is the conduct of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity." ' 18 9 Numerous courts have found a
requirement that a nexus exist between the racketeering activity and the
affairs of the enterprise. 190 A holding to the contrary would seem to ignore
the express language that a defendant must conduct the affairs of and be
associated with the enterprise. For example, a defendant may be employed
by a large corporation, an enterprise for purposes of section 1961(4), and
he may collect unlawful debts while at work.' 9 ' Courts would almost
certainly find that evidence insufficient to establish a RICO violation. As
observed by one court, "[t]he mere fact that a defendant works for a
legitimate enterprise and commits racketeering acts while on the business
premises does not establish that the affairs of the enterprise have been
92
conducted 'through' a pattern of racketeering activity.'
Courts have not been uniform, however, in their treatment of the
requisite nexus between the racketeering activity and the enterprise. For
example, a panel of the Fourth Circuit held that the racketeering activity
must relate to the operation or management of the enterprise. 193 Another
1332.
189. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir. 1981) (court rejected
defendant's double jeopardy argument that he could not be convicted both of a RICO
conspiracy and a continuing series of narcotics violations because a RICO conspiracy is
separate from the substantive offenses in that RICO penalizes the conduct of an enterprise
through criminal activity), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1982). Section 1961(5) states that
"a 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of
which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within
ten years . . . after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. §
1961(5).
190. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1332 (defendant's use of Cauble Enterprises' property held a
sufficient nexus); United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 544 (5th Cir.) (sufficient nexus
between affairs of the Louisiana Department of Agriculture and defendant's criminal
conduct because defendant's position as head of the department "enabled him to hawk its
services for personal gain"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982); United States v. Webster,
639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir.) (court reversed RICO convictions because defendants' use of tavern
to aid sale of narcotics did not benefit or advance affairs of the tavern, the enterprise alleged
by the government), cert. deniedsub noma, Christian v. United States, 454 U.S. 857 (1981),
affd on reh'g, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.) (court rejected benefit test and found use of tavern
and its employees sufficient), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935 (1982); United States v. Scotto, 641
F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (sufficient nexus found because defendants' extortion of money from
waterfront businesses was made possible by their position in the enterprise), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 961 (1981).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978), afl'd, 625
F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1980) (defendant's employment by General Motors Assembly Division
and collection of unlawful debts on its premises failed to establish nexus).
192. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1332.
193. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
961 (1980) (affirming the lower court's judgment of acquittal of former Maryland
Governor Mandel on RICO count because receipt of part interest in a business as a bribe did
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panel of the Fourth Circuit held that the racketeering activities must
benefit the enterprise.194
The benefit test1 95 would seriously curtail RICO's application to cases
like that of Local 54. Most corrupt union practices do not benefit the union;
indeed, corrupt practices by unionists have been made unlawful under
federal law because of the harm to the union and the rank and file
membership. 196 If the pattern of racketeering alleged were the raids on the
union and benefit funds, the major focus of the PSI report, the government
could not allege Local 54 as the relevant enterprise under the benefit test.
Even under the strict benefit test, the government might pursue a very
limited prosecution against several defendants. The PSI suggests in their
report that Al Diadone contracted to have union rival John McCullough
killed because of his attempt to bring bartenders into a rival union.1 97 If the
government could show other acts similarly motivated by a desire to
protect the union's power, it might be able to proceed even under the benefit
analysis.198
The benefit test appears unnecessarily begrudging. Focus on the
actor's motive, generally irrelevant in the criminal law, 199 would seem to be
a technical nicety not consonant with the intent of the statute or with a bona
fide interest of the defendant. Under the benefit analysis, the corrupt
unionist acting entirely against the union's interest might escape conviction while the ambivalent or altruistic unionist would be culpable.
not meet requirement that he manage or control that business, the relevant RICO
enterprises).
194. United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 185-86 (4th Cir.) (insufficient nexus
between tavern and defendant's use of tavern to conduct drug transactions because drug
transactions did not benefit tavern, the enterprise alleged by the government), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 857 (1981), affid on reh'g, 669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1982). While affirming on
rehearing, the court in Webster rejected the benefit analysis. Webster, 669 F.2d at 186.
195. The "benefit" test adopted in the first Webster decision would require that the
enterprise benefit from the racketeering activity. See Webster, 639 F.2d at 183-86.
196. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 110 (describing numerous illegal activities
of corrupt union officials who acted contrary to union members' interests and who destroyed
union democracy).
197. See PSI Report, supra note 7, at 65 (suggesting fact that union rivalry was
motive for killing was "common knowledge").
198. It has been held generally that two predicate acts are required to prove a RICO
violation. However, one court found that conspiracy to commit murder and the completed
offense were sufficient. United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1984) (members
of Cleveland's organized crime family conspired to murder leader of rival criminal
organization which had monopoly on criminal activity in West Cleveland; the crime was
finally completed after several unsuccessful attempts; RICO counts were based only on the
conspiracy to murder and the completed crime).

199. See W.

LAFAvE

& A. ScoTT,

HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW

29 (1972).
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The operation or management test2 0 also seems wide of the mark. It
derives some force from the express language of the statute,20 1 but it is clear
that Congress intended to ensnare the "small fry" as well as those in control
of an enterprise.20 2 The test also suggests a technical analysis which would
focus on whether the unionist was acting ultra vires instead of operating or
managing the affairs of the enterprise when he committed acts of
racketeering. As discussed below, it would appear that such a technical
reading is beyond congressional intent.20 3
Most courts have rejected the benefit and the management test for a
test which looks at the requisite nexus between the enterprise and the
various criminal acts. 20 4 Both contentions have been raised and rejected in
the context of labor racketeering. 0 5 For example, in United States v.
Scotto,20 6 Anthony Scotto, once "a rising star in the labor world," who was
200. In United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1375 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 961 (1980), the Fourth Circuit held that" 1962(c) required some involvement in
the operation or management of the business ... ," a requirement found in the statute's
"conduct or participate" language.
201. Under section 1962(c), a person must "conduct or participate" in the affairs of
the enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom.
Hawkins v. United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (court found that single RICO conspiracy
existed where several defendants participated in wide variety of crimes even though most
defendants were unaware of activity of other co-defendants; court rejected argument of
peripheral participants that RICO excludes "small fry").
203. See notes 223-39 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367,402 (1981), affd, 681 F.2d 952
(5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16 (1983). In Martino, several co-defendants served in various capacities in an arson
ring. Defendant Lazzara filed a fraudulent insurance claim after his laundromat was
torched by the group. Martino,648 F.2d at 402. The Fifth Circuit rejected his contention
that he did not manage or control the arson ring, stating merely that "[i] t was not necessary
to show that Lazzara was in a management position for a conviction under RICO." Id.
United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 613-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (charges arose out of
activity relating to defendants' union positions, including threats to non-union fur
manufacturers who subcontracted with union-shop manufacturers; court held that RICO
required relationship between predicate acts), affid, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976).
205. See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.) (defendant
Provenzano, president of a Teamsters' local, accepted payments from co-defendant, owner
of several trucking companies, not to enforce agreement that required company to use local
union members for certain pickup and delivery services), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071
(1982); United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982) (defendant LeRoy, vicepresident of local laborers union, was placed on payroll of several subcontractors although
he performed no work for them), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983); United States v.
Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (defendant Scotto, president of ILA local in Brooklyn,
extorted substantial sums of money from shipping and stevedore companies by virtue of his
union position), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
206. 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
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assumed to be headed for control of the AFL-CIO, 0 7 was indicted as a
result of the Justice Department's UNIRAC investigation. 20 8 Scotto was

charged on a multiple count indictment of conducting the affairs of Local
1814 of the International Longshoremen's Association through a pattern
of racketeering activity and of various related crimes. 0 9 Scotto received
large sums of money from several companies doing business on the
waterfront for assistance in reducing fraudulent and extravagant workers'
compensation claims by ILA members and for helping them to secure and
retain business.2 10
Before the Second Circuit, Scotto contended that the district court
erroneously rejected his jury charge that it had to find that the pattern of
racketeering "concerned or related to the operation or management of the
enterprise" and "[ajffected the affairs of the [union] in its essential
functions."21 1 The court recognized that RICO does not specify the
requisite nexus between the pattern of racketeering and the enterprise, but
rejected the management and control test. 2 12 .The court adopted the
following test:
.. . one conducts the activities of an enterprise through a pattern of

racketeering when (1) one is enabled to commit the predicate offenses
solely by virtue of his position in the enterprise or involvement in or control
over the affairs of the enterprise, or (2) the predicate offenses are related to
21 3
the activities of that enterprise.

The Second Circuit reiterated that test in another labor racketeering
case, United States v. LeRoy.214 There, the defendant, the vice-president of
a laborer's local, was on the payroll of several subcontractors for whom he
performed no work. 21 65 The court rejected his claim that the government's

evidence was insufficient because it "proved at most illegal conduct
committed in furtherance of LeRoy's personal interest, but not in the
207. Welling, On the Waterfront, BARRON'S, Jan. 21, 1980, at 8.
208. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 6, at 363 (acronym for union racketeering).
209. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 50.
210. Id. at 51-52.
211. Id. at 54.
212. Id.
213. Id. Scotto has been followed by the Third Circuit. See United States v.
Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.) (Provenzano, president of Teamsters local, accepted

payments from co-defendant, owner of several trucking companies, not to enforce
agreement that required companies to use local union members for certain pickup and
delivery services), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 861 (1983).
214. 687 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983).
215. Id. at 613-14. LeRoy also converted union funds. Id. at 614.
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conduct of the union's business. 21 6
While other courts have failed to articulate a test to determine the
requisite nexus, 17 and, after initially failing to do so, 218 the Fifth Circuit
recently announced its nexus test, as a modification of the Scotto test, in
United States v. Cauble.21 9 It held:
A defendant does not "conduct" or "participate in the conduct" of a lawful
enterprise's affairs, unless (1) the defendant has in fact committed the
racketeering acts as alleged; (2) the defendant's position in the enterprise
facilitated his commission of the racketeering acts,
and (3) the predicate
220
acts had some effect on the lawful enterprise.
Neither the Cauble nor the Scotto test is without difficulty. The PSI
report indicates that Philadelphia area crime family members helped to
place their friends in control of Local 54 with the complicity of Ed
Hanley. 221 Once in control, officials of the local contracted with HCA to
provide dental services. HCA paid various administrative fees to Lawrence
Smith. Smith apparently paid at least part of those fees to Angelo Bruno
and his representatives. Smith and HCA received substantial administrative fees from the dental plan for services that were unnecessary or not
performed.2 2
The Fifth Circuit's test applies quite obviously to Local 54 union
officials and possibly to Hanley.22 3 It is less clear how it affects Smith, HCA
and its employees, and organized crime family members caught with their
hands in the dental funds. The first criterion would be a matter of proof at
trial, but the PSI strongly suggests that each of the named parties
216. Id. at 616.
217. Martino, 648 F.2d 367; United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 861 (7th Cir.)

(defendant, business agent for local union, accepted money as union steward for services he
did not perform; court rejected defendant's contention that government failed to establish
that he was conducting his own, not union's, affairs; court observed only that "evidence
demonstrated that defendant was conducting or participating in the affairs of Local 714
when he committed acts for which he was charged"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977).
218. See, e.g., United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.) (sufficient nexus
between affairs of the Louisiana Department of Agriculture and defendant's criminal
conduct because his position as head of the Department "enabled him to hawk its services
for personal gain"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982).
219. 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 941 (1984).
220. Id. at 1332-33.
221. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 64-65. The PSI suggests that Hanley approved the
merger of locals 54 and 33 in order to consolidate the power of Gerace and Diadone, both
closely associated with the Philadelphia crime family. Id. at 65.
222. Id. at 110-16.

223. If applied literally, the test may not apply to Hanley, because he presumably had
a "position" in the international union, but not in the local union.
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committed racketeering acts.2 2 The third criterion would also seem to be
met: their acts have an effect on the enterprise in that siphoning funds from
the plan hampers Local 54's efforts to provide adequate dental care to its
members. The difficulty is with the second criterion, that a defendant has a
position in the enterprise which facilitates commission of the crime. If
strictly applied, the second criterion presents an obstacle to the government. Smith and HCA, for example, were independent contractors who
had no position in the union. Angelo Bruno and his representatives had no
legal relationship with or position in the enterprise.22 5
The government might anticipate that difficulty by charging a
different enterprise, an association-in-fact, the purpose of which was to
siphon off union funds.22 6 But the Cauble test is unnecessarily begrudging.
RICO was adopted in response to corrupt union practices virtually
identical to those identified by the PSI Report.2 2 7 Its drafters envisioned
situations in which men like Jimmy Hoffa were diverting funds from the
union treasury to crime syndicate friends. RICO was intended to cripple
organized crime, not merely corrupt unionists.2 2 8 Further, the statute itself
states that one must be an employee or associated with the enterprise.2 29
That language has been correctly interpreted to include individuals not on
an enterprise's payroll.230 Section 1962(c) also makes unlawful participation in the affairs of the enterprise "directly or indirectly."'2 3 1 The Cauble
224. See infra notes 274-319 and accompanying text.
225. Interestingly, apart from a nexus element, section 1962(c) also requires that a
person be associated with the enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Unlike the Fifth Circuit's
insistence that one have a "position" in the enterprise to meet the nexus test, courts have
construed the association element loosely. See, e.g., United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d
1127 (3d Cir. 1977) (sixty-one defendants were indicted for RICOviolations arising out of
systematic payments by bail bond agency to various magistrates, constables, and other
court and law enforcement officials for referrals of criminal defendants to agency). The
Third Circuit rejected the argument that magistrates and constables were not associated
with the enterprise, the agency, because they were independent and outside of its affairs. Id.
at 1135-36.
226. While the government has considerable flexibility in alleging a particular
enterprise, it must conform its proof at trial to the enterprise alleged in the indictment. See,
e.g.. United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1196 (8th Cir. 1982) (conviction sustained
under alternative theory of illegal enterprise), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983).
227. See supra notes 103-42 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 144. See also Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1350 n. 109 (purpose of RICO
forfeiture clause is to remove all corrupt influences from ownership and control).
229. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
230. See, e.g., United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977) (while
magistrates and constables did not work for bail bond agency, the RICO enterprise,
evidence was sufficient because it is enough to participate indirectly in the affairs of the
enterprise).
231. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
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test's insistence that one have a "position" in the enterprise seems to ignore
the express language. It would appear that the Bruno crime family
members had sufficient defacto control over Local 54's operations to be
liable under section 1962(c) without holding a position in the enterprise. 3 2
By contrast, the Scotto test avoids some of the analytic problem
created by Cauble. All of the various defendants would seem to be
encompassed under the first prong of Scotto's nexus test: union officials
were able to enter rigged contract bids by virtue of their official position.
Further, while not holding an official position, Smith and members of the
Bruno crime family, for example, may have had control over the affairs of
the enterprise by their ongoing relationship with their union associates. 2a3
Hanley's legal relationship to the local union would be irrelevant under this
test. Quite clearly, he had control over the affairs of the various local
unions.1 4
If the Scotto test has a weakness, it is the second disjunctive test, that
"one conducts the activities of an enterprise. . . when. . . the predicate
offenses are related to the activities of that enterprise. ' 2 5 This does not
articulate the underlying purpose of the nexus requirement. For example, a
union official may commit a "pattern of racketeering activity" by using a
union automobile for personal use on two occasions. 2 6 The misuse of union
property would seem to relate to the union's activity in the same manner, if
not degree, as would the raid on Local 54's dental plan. 231 As observed by
one of RICO's frequent critics, "Scotto fails to acknowledge the obvious
fact that some acts have some relationship to the enterprise but play too
23 8
minor a role in operating an enterprise.
232. It is uncertain how strictly the Fifth Circuit would apply its own test. Cauble was
one of the partners of Cauble Enterprises, a limited partnership under Texas law. 706 F.2d
at 1350. Other participants in the criminal scheme to import large quantities of marijuana
held no position in Cauble Enterprises, but were not before the court in Cauble.Id. at 133539.
233. PSI Report, supranote 7, at 64-65. See also N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1984, § B, at 2,
col. 1.
234. See supra notes 22-59 and accompanying text.
235. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54.
236. See, e.g., United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1976) ( 50)(c) violation
based in part on improper use of union purchased automobile). In turn, 29 U.S.C. 501(c) is
a predicate act under RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). See also United States v. Gibson, 675
F.2d 825 (6th Cir.) ( 501(c) violation based in part on use of union airplane for personal
trip), cert. denied, 459 U.S 972 (1982).
237. Both acts may violate section 501 (c). See 29 U.S.C. § 501 (c). Improper use of an
automobile may be trivial, but the Scotto test fails to distinguish between trivial and
substantial offenses as long as they relate to the enterprise's activities. Scotto, 641 F.2d at

54.
238. Tarlow, RICORevisited, supranote 95, at 376 n.357. Absent judicial interpreta-
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The facts alleged in the PSI report evidence some of the analytic
problems arising under RICO. Those facts also suggest how the nexus
question ought to be resolved. Mere relationship between the crime and the
enterprise offers too little guidance to a grand jury indicting a suspect or to
a petit jury trying a defendant. Requiring that one have a position in the
enterprise distracts attention from the underlying purpose of the act and
may elevate form over substance. Probably the most efficacious solution
would be to adopt the first Scotto test and also require that "the predicate
acts [have] some effect on the lawful enterprise. "239
D. The Pattern of Racketeering
As discussed above, an individual does not commit a RICO offense
unless he is a member of an enterprise and unless there is a connection
between the enterprise and the pattern of racketeering.24 This section
discusses problems in interpreting the term "pattern."
Section 1961(5) states, in part, that a pattern of racketeering
"requires at least two acts of racketeering activity . .. ""' That section is
not, however, a definition of the requisite "pattern." Several cases have
considered whether some requirement in addition to the commission of two
predicate acts is necessary to prove that essential element.2 ' 2
tion limiting the government's ability to use RICO, whether multiple trivial violations of,
for example, section 501(c), 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (making unlawful theft or conversion of
anything of value from labor organization of which defendant is employed amount to RICO
violation), is entrusted entirely to the government and the grand jury. The government is not
immune from abusing RICO. See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 486 F. Supp. 1230, 124345 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (dismissing RICO counts against former General SecretaryTreasurer of H EREIU for trivial violations of section 501(c)), a]f'd, 675 F.2d 825 (6th Cir.)
(affirming judgment of sentence for violations of substantive offenses), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 972 (1982).
239. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1333.
240. See supra notes 161-72, 183-239 and accompanying text.
241. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
242. See United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 1982).
Defendants, members of La Cosa Nostra, were convicted of various charges arising out of a
scheme to extort money from pornographers and bookmakers. Id. at 1213. The court found
the jury instructions on the RICO counts adequate because "[tihe term 'enterprise' was
defined and the jury was instructed that they must find that each defendant was employed
by or associated with a racketeering enterprise, and that the racketeering offenses were
connected by a common scheme, plan, or motive so as to constitute a pattern 'and not merely
a series of disconnected acts.'" Id. at 1222. See, e.g., United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d
1120, 1136-37 (1st Cir. 1981) (various defendants were convicted of RICO conspiracy
arising out of efforts to fix horse races; court held that in addition to agreeing to commit at
least two predicate acts, each defendant must have agreed to participate in the affairs of the
enterprise), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1982); United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 830
n.47 (5th Cir. 1980) (defendants included a county sheriff, the operator of an illegal club,
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The case law demonstrates concern about three different problems .243
The following hypothetical cases illustrate those issues. In 1984, the
president and vice president of a union extort money from an employer by
promising to avert a strike, in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act,2 4 ' and use
a union airplane for personal trips in violation of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act.2 45 In a relatively short period of time, the
defendants have each committed two predicate acts. The acts, however, are
unrelated to one another even though they were committed by the
defendants while they were conducting the affairs of the same enterprise.
A second case might involve defendants, also union officials, who
violate section 501 in 1979 by using union automobiles and a condominium
owned by the union for personal activity.24 6 Years later, they violate the
same statute by engaging in similar misuse of union property. Unlike the
first example, the defendants have acted together in committing similar
crimes, but the activity is sporadic.
A third example might involve two union officials who conspire to
murder a union rival and who accomplish that goal.2 47 Like the first two
examples, these defendants have committed at least two crimes. Depending on the jurisdiction, the conspiracy may not merge with the completed
offense.24 8 Unlike the earlier examples, this case involves a single criminal
episode even though the defendants committed more than one offense.
men who collected illegal payoffs made to the sheriff, and men who bribed the sheriff for
various privileges; the court found sufficient evidence to sustain defendant Bright's RICO
conviction based on two predicate acts of bribery, but noted, however, that "predicate
crimes need only be related to the affairs of the enterprise- they need not be related to each
other."); United States v. Ladmer, 429 F. Supp. 1231, 1243-44 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)
(government's evidence insufficient to convict union officials of RICO count because two
acts of racketeering must share common scheme, plan or motive, and must also relate to the
essential function of the union, the enterprise charged by the government).
243. See Tarlow, RICO Revisited, supra note 95, at 346-56.
244. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (Supp. 1984-1985) (dealing with restrictions on payments and

loans to labor organizations).
245. 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (relating to embezzlement and conversion from union funds).
246. Id.
247. Cf United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1984) (members of

Cleveland's organized crime family conspired to murder leader of rival criminal organization which had monopoly on criminal activity in West Cleveland; crime was finally
completed after several unsuccessful attempts; RICO counts were based only on conspiracy
to murder and completed crime).
248. See, e.g., lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975). In Iannelli, the
defendants were convicted of both participating in an illegal gambling business and
conspiring to do so. Id. at 771-72. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Third
Circuit, permitting conviction and sentence on both counts and found that the presumption
of merger of conspiracy and the substantive offense under Wharton's Rule may be overriden
by Congress. Id. at 791.
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The legislative history suggests that the acts must be related to each
other.149 Senator McClellan, RICO's sponsor, made clear his view that a
"pattern" of racketeering activity meant something more than the commission of two predicate offenses.2 50 Further, he cited the Senate subcommittee report to illuminate Congress' intent on that point:
The [American Civil Liberties] union offers an inaccurate and
prejudicial criticism of title IX when it states that "pattern of 'racketeering
activity' is defined as two or more acts of 'racketeering activity,' " and
worries that a person could be subjected to the sanctions of title IX simply
for committing two widely separated and isolated criminal offenses, one of
which related to an interstate business. Again, a careful reading of title IX
would have informed the union that commission of two or more acts of
racketeering activity is made a necessary, but not a sufficient element of a

pattern under title IX. As the Senate committee report points out:
The target of title IX is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of
legitimate business normally requires more than one "racketeering activity" and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is thisfactor of
continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern.

The term "pattern" itself requires the showing of a relationship and
the committee report thus reinforces that interpretation. So, therefore,
proof of two acts of racketeering activity, without more, does not establish a
pattern and the ACLU's fears are unwarranted. 51
Despite this statement of legislative intent, courts and commentators
have not always given separate content to "pattern" apart from the
commission of two separate predicate acts.2 52 Chief RICO draftsman,
Professor G. Robert Blakey, one of the most influential commentators on
RICO, for example, seemed to recognize that "the racketeering acts must
be 'related' to each other.125 3 In explaining that relationship, however, he
249. See, e.g., RICO SENATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 158. "The target of Title IX is
thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more
than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective." Id. at
79.
250. McClellan, supra note 20, at 144.
251. Id. (emphasis added).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.) (court found that single
RICO conspiracy existed where several defendants participated in wide variety of crimes
even though most defendants were unaware of activity of other co-defendants and criminal
activity ranged from narcotics transactions to murder), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978);
United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (defendants were
indicted on charges arising out of operation of theater through use of securities fraud and
bankruptcy fraud; court found that "the only relation deemed necessary for two predicate
acts is that they both be in the conduct of the affairs of the same enterprise"). See also
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 26, at 1029.

253. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 26, at 1029. Blakey has written on RICO
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criticized the cases which insist upon a relationship between the predicate
acts, instead asserting that: "The notion that two predicate crimes can be
related by reference to a common enterprise is consistent with the
legislative history, which defines 'pattern' as not 'isolated.' "254
Professor Blakey and several courts believe that a relationship
between the predicate acts and the enterprise is sufficient to constitute a
"pattern. 2' 55 It is submitted that such a view is erroneous. As discussed
earlier, courts have required a nexus between the enterprise and the
commission of various crimes.2 56 The nexus element is found in the
requirement that individuals conduct the affairs of the enterprise through
the pattern of racketeering. 2 57 For example, in all of the foregoing
hypotheticals, the defendants would meet either the Scotto or Cauble
nexus test. The question still remains, however, whether their crime
constitutes a "pattern." Professor Blakey would read out of existence the
term "pattern." Under his definition of "pattern," a defendant violates
section 1962(c) if he conducts the affairs of the enterprise through
2 58
racketeering activity.
Even if Professor Blakey's view is erroneous, it is not entirely clear
how a court ought to define "pattern." At a minimum, cases finding a
pattern where multiple crimes are committed during a single criminal
episode are indefensible. 5 9 Common usage suggests replication of criminal activity, rather than a single episode. 6 Once past the express
frequently. See, e.g., Blakey, The RICO Civil FraudAction in Context: Reflections on
Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237 (1982); Blakey & Gettings, supranote 26, at
1029; Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 6. He has been cited frequently both by courts, see,
e.g., Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1330 n.7, and commentators; see, e.g., Tarlow, RICO Revisited
supra note 95, at 294 n.4.
254. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 6, at 355.
255. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880,889 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
256. See supra notes 183-239 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1331-33; Scotto, 641 F.2d at 54.
258. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (prohibiting investment of income derived from pattern
of racketeering for purpose of acquiring intrest or control of any enterprise engaged in
interstate commerce).
259. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1981)
(defendant Echezarreta's two predicate offenses consisted of possession with intent to
distribute and distribution of same marijuana); United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d
595, 601-02 (7th Cir. 1978) ("pattern" consisted of five mailings during single fraud
scheme). It is hard to understand how the accomplishment of one criminal purpose can
become a "pattern."
260. THE AMERICANHERITAGE DICTIONARY (ed. 1978) defines "pattern" as: "l.a.
An archetype b. An ideal worthy of imitation . . . 2. A plan, diagram or model to be
followed in making things. . . 3. A representative, sample, specimen. . . 5. A composite of
traits or features characteristic of an individual ..
"
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language, the legislative history makes certain that Congress intended to
punish continuity of criminal conduct, not a single criminal episode.2"'
Given the Senate report's assertion that there must be a continuity of
activity, one might expect that courts would hold that a pattern requires
the acts to be committed within a limited period of time. One commentator
has found a dirth of case law on that point.26 2
In addition to continuity, "pattern" suggests some similarity between
or among the predicate acts.263 Some courts have held that "pattern"
requires a common scheme, plan, or motive.2 64 Such a holding does not
261. See McClellan, supranote 20, at 144. In United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040
(6th Cir. 1984), the court held that the pattern of racketeering activity consisted of
conspiracy to commit murder and the completed act. Id. at 1045-47. It held that a
conspiracy to violate state law may constitute a predicate act under section 1961 (1)(A). Id.
at 1047. That provision, however, states that "(1) racketeering activity means (A) any act
or threat involving murder ..
" 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A). A conspiracy is not a "threat
involving" a crime; furthermore, it is hornbook law that the essence of a conspiracy is an
agreement and, depending on the jurisdiction, may involve no overt act at all. W. LAFAVE &
A. ScoTT, supra note 199, 61 at 453,476. Thus, it would seem unlikely that a conspiracy to
commit the crime is "an act involving" that crime. By contrast to section 1961(l)(A),
section 1961 (1 )(D) provides that a pattern of racketeering includes "any offense involving"
securities fraud, bankruptcy fraud, or felonious dealing with dangerous drugs. 18 U.S.C. §
1961 (1)(D). A conspiracy to commit, for example, securities fraud is an "offense involving"
securities fraud. Courts have correctly construed section 19611()(D) as permitting proof of
a conspiracy to commit those enumerated offenses as a predicate act. See, e.g., United
States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123-24 (2d Cir.) (defendants operated the Westchester Premier Theatre "through a wide ranging pattern of fraud", including a fraudulent
public offering of common stock, and conversion of money received by the Theatre to their
own use; the court interpreted § 1961(1)(D), defining "racketeering activity", to include a
conspiracy to commit securities or bankruptcy fraud), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
There is also legislative history supporting the view that section 1961 (1)(A) should be read
as excluding conspiracy to violate state law. See Tarlow, RICO Revisited, supra note 95, at
358 nn.284-85. It is quite conceivable that Congress chose to exclude state conspiracies
because of concern that RICO would then punish a conspiracy to conspire.
262. Tarlow, RICO Revisited, supra note 95, at 348 ("Most cases have involved
patterns arising from the commission of many racketeering acts in relatively short periods
of time..." (citing, e.g.. United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir. 1976)
(several illegal card games within 19 months)); United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp.
189, 192-93 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (acceptance of four bribes to obtain entrance into graduate
schools over two-and-one-half years).
263. See supra note 260.
264. See, e.g., United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 1982). In
dicta, the court in Brooklier observed that "[t]he pattern [of racketeering] may be
established by showing two or more acts that constitute offenses, conspiracies, or attempts
of the requisite type, as long as the defendant committed two of the acts and both of them
were connected by a common scheme, plan or motive." Id. See, e.g., United States v.
Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 677-78 (7th Cir.) (defendants were convicted of charges arising out
of a scheme to commit arson with intent to defraud an insurer; evidence was sufficient
because the single arson and crimes of mail fraud and interstate travel with intent to commit
arson were "connected to each other in some logical manner ....
"), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
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require merely replication of a particular crime. It gives content to the term
"pattern" when there is some similarity, whether in the acts themselves or
the purpose of the acts. It also comports with the policy of RICO to punish

systematic corruption, not simply isolated criminal activity. " "
In the Local 54 case, the government would almost certainly be able to
allege a pattern, but the court's understanding of the requisite pattern
would determine which crimes might be admitted into evidence. Even
under a restrictive definition of pattern requiring both continuity in time
and a common scheme, plan or motive, the PSI Report evidences the
following pattern: several defendants, including Bruno crime family
members, local union officials, Lawrence Smith, and possibly other
individuals, made or received multiple pay-offs illegally siphoned from
Local 54's dental plan.266 The repeated nature of the activity would take
the case beyond a single criminal episode. Payments to Smith, for example,
were made on a monthly basis and over a course of at least two different
contracts. 26 7 Quite obviously, these various crimes would meet the common scheme, plan or motive requirement. The several individuals replicated the same scheme or plan, using Smith's corporation to duplicate
administrative services to generate money for pay-offs. The motive would
also be the same - disgorging money from the benefit plans for personal
use.

268

The more difficult question would be whether the conspiracy to
murder union rival John McCullough 6 9 and the sale of labor peace might
826 (1981). But see United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 830 n.47 (5th Cir. 1980) (no
pattern is required among the crimes as long as the crimes relate to the enterprise).
265. Requiring replication of the same crime would not seem to be consistent with the
legislative history which suggests that the acts might be part of a single scheme or plan, for
example, to take over an enterprise. See McClellan, supra note 20, at 144.
266. See supra notes 73-102 and accompanying text.
267. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 110-12.
268. A change in personnel generally does not refute the existence of an enterprise,
even if the enterprise is an "association-in-fact." Instead, there must be some continuity in
membership, See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). In Turkette, the
defendants were charged with a RICO violation for operating an enterprise as "a group of
" Id.
individuals associated in fact for the purpose of illegally trafficking in narcotics ...
at 579. The Court held that an enterprise, when composed of individuals associated in fact,
is "proved by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit." Id. at 583.
See United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1982). The court in Lemm found
evidence sufficient to show continuity of both structure and personnel of the enterprise.
Continuity of structure was shown by "unchanging pattern of roles. . . necessary. . . to
carry out predicate acts of racketeering." Id. at 1199. Despite some changes in personnel,
evidence was sufficient because "associational ties of those charged with a RICO violation
amount to an original pattern or system of authority." Id.
269. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. It is interesting to observe that
even if convicted and sentenced on the predicate act, a defendant cannot successfully
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also constitute part of the pattern of racketeering. From a defendant's
standpoint, allowing admission of such evidence is disasterous. As the
number of predicate acts and co-defendants increase, the trial becomes
increasingly oppressive.170 Further, a defendant may be prejudiced by
introduction of evidence of heinous crimes in which he had no direct role
and of which he had no knowledge." 1 That evidence is admissible if the
court concludes that the crime was committed as a part of the pattern of
2 72
racketeering.
According to the PSI Report, the murder and extortion were committed contemporaneously with the raids on the benefit funds. It would be
harder, however, to link the conspiracy to murder to the dental plan scheme
or to the extortion. A court might find that the crimes shared a common
motive, but only by a very liberal interpretation of motive. The dental plan
scheme and extortion were motivated by the desire to enrich the participants in those crimes. The murder probably had multiple motives:
maintenance of the union's control might have been primary, while the
motive to maintain control might have been desirable in order to allow the
various participants to continue to dominate the union's benefit plans.
challenge a RICO prosecution based on double jeopardy. See, e.g., United States v.
Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 309 (7th Cir. 1979) (defendants planned and performed various
robberies of victims in their homes; one defendant was also convicted in state court of one of
the robberies charged as predicate offense; court held that separate punishment did not
constitute double jeopardy because not only were separate sovereigns involved, but crimes
were also separate and distinct), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v.
Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 757 (5th Cir. 1978) (various defendants were charged with
conducting enterprise "to obtain money, marijuana, and cocaine ... "; pattern of
racketeering activity included series of assaults, kidnappings, thefts, robberies and
"thuggeries"; one defendant was found not guilty in state court on charges of robbery and
kidnapping; court held that federal prosecution after state acquittal did not place defendant
in double jeopardy), cert. denied, sub nor. Bertolitti v. United States, 440 U.S. 962 (1979).
270. See, e.g., United States v. Marcello, 537 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. La. 1982),
(defendants Carlos Marcello, reputed Mafia boss in New Orleans, and Charles Roemer,
Louisiana Commissioner of Administration, were convicted of conspiracy to violate RICO,
but they were acquitted of several additional charges; several other defendants were
acquitted of all counts; purpose of conspiracy was to associate together in fact as an
enterprise for purpose of obtaining state employees insurance contract through various acts
of bribery; trial took eighteen weeks) aff d sub nom., United States v. Roemer, 703 F.2d 805
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 341 (1983).
271. See Tarlow, RICO Revisited, supra note 95, at 417. "Perhaps the most
significant procedural benefit to the Government of alleging a RICO count is an enhanced
ability to join large numbers of defendants and apparently unrelated substantive offenses in
a single trial." Id.
272. See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendants
found part of "enterprise," and were tried with co-defendants charged with numerous
crimes, including murder, despite defendants' lack of participation in or knowledge of
murder), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1979).
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Defining the scheme too broadly erodes the meaning of "pattern." For
example, if the scheme is running a corrupt union then any corrupt act is
part of the pattern. This definition has the effect of reading "pattern" out of
27 3
the statute.
The PSI Report almost certainly demonstrates a pattern of racketeering. The interesting question in a prosecution against those associated with
the union may be how many crimes the government attempts to encompass
within the pattern.
E. Racketeering Activity
All RICO offenses require a "pattern of racketeering activity.

27

At

a minimum, a pattern of racketeering consists of two acts of racketeering as
defined by section 1961 (1).""8 That section includes eight state offenses,
described generically, and twenty-four federal offenses.2 76 That Congress
273. See supra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
274. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-1962(d).
275. Id. § 1961(5) ("pattern of racketeering activity requires at least two acts of
racketeering activity, one of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of
imprisonment) after commission of prior act of racketeering activity.").
276. Id. 1961(1). Section 1961(1)(A) sets forth the state offenses: "any act or threat
involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in
narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year .
" I.
Id. § 1961(1)(A).
The federal offenses are as follows:
any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United
States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports
bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659
(relating to theft from interstate shipment if the act indictable under section 659 is
felonious), section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds),
sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084
(relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to
mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to
obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement),
section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion),
section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate
transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful
welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal
gambling businesses), section 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation
of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband
cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic),. . . any act which is
indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions
on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to
embezzlement from union funds),. . .any offense involving fraud connected with a
case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture,
importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in
narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States;
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included a number of crimes within section 1961 (1) aimed primarily at
labor racketeering is not surprising in light of Senator McClellan's pivotal
role in enactment of both RICO and labor reform statutes. 7 This section

Id. § 1961(1)(B)-(D).
277. See, e.g., id. §§ 664, 1954; 29 U.S.C. §§ 186, 501(c). Section 186 of Title 29,
which prohibits, inter alia, the sale of labor peace may be applicable to the case under
analysis. The subcommittee, however, did not report substantial evidence concerning the
sale of labor peace or extortion by Local 54 officials. See, e.g., PSI Report, supra note 7, at
67.
Section 664 of Title 18 provides:
Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or
converts to his own use or to the use of another, any of the moneys, funds, securities,
premiums, credits, property, or other assets of any employee welfare benefit plan or
employee pension benefit plan, or of any fund connected therewith, shall be fined
not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
As used in this section, the term "any employee welfare benefit plan or
employee pension benefit plan" means any employee benefit plan subject to any
provision of title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.
18 U.S.C. § 664. Section 1954 of Title 18 provides in relevant part:
Whoever being (1) an administrator, officer, trustee, custodian, counsel, agent, or employee of
any employee welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefit plan; or
(2) an officer, counsel, agent, or employee of an employer or an employer any of
whose employees are covered by such plan; or
(3) an officer, counsel, agent, or employee of an employee organization any of
whose members are covered by such plan; or
(4) a person who, or an officer, counsel, agent, or employee of an organization
which, provides benefit plan services to such plan
receives or agrees to receive or solicits any fee, kickback, commission, gift, loan,
money or thing of value because of or with intent to be influenced with respect to,
any of his actions, decisions, or other duties relating to any question or matter
concerning such plan or any person who directly or indirectly gives or offers, or
promises to give or offer, any fee, kickback, commission, gift, loan, money, or thing
of value prohibited by this section, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both: Provided,That this section shall not
prohibit the payment to or acceptance by any person of bona fide salary,
compensation, or other payments made for goods or facilities actually furnished or
for services actually performed in the regular course of his duties as such person,
administrator, officer, trustee, custodian, counsel, agent, or employee of such plan,
employer, employee organization, or organization providing benefit plan services to
such plan. ...
Id. § 1954. Section 501(c) of Title 29 provides:
Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or
converts to his own use, or the use of another, any of the moneys, funds, securities,
property, or other assets of a labor organization of which he is an officer, or by which
he is employed, directly or indirectly, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
29 U.S.C. § 501(c). Section 186 of Title 29 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer or association of employers or any
person who acts as a labor relations expert, adviser, or consultant to an employer or
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reviews two of those provisions because of their relevance to the case under

analysis.
It has been well-documented that union pension and benefit funds are
tempting targets for organized crime and corrupt unionists. 78 As discussed below, corrupt unionists have used a variety of means to convert
union benefit funds,2 79 but the provisions governing management of those
funds are relatively straight forward.
Section 501 (a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act creates a fiduciary duty for "It] he officers, agents, shop stewards, and
other representatives of a labor organization .. ."28o Section 501(b)
who acts in the interest of an employer to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend,
or deliver, any money or other thing of value (1)to any representative of any of his employees who are employed in an
industry affecting commerce; or
(2) to any labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof, which
represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership, any of the employees
of such employer who are employed in an industry affecting commerce; or
(3) to any employee or group or committee of employees of such employer
employed in an industry affecting commerce in excess of their normal compensation for the purpose of causing such employee or group or committee directly or
indirectly to influence any other employees in the exercise of the right to organize
and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing; or
(4) to any officer or employee of a labor organization engaged in an industry
affecting commerce with intent to influence him in respect to any of his actions,
decisions, or duties as a representative of employees or as such officer or employee of
such labor organization.
(b)(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to request, demand, receive, or
accept, or agree to receive or accept, any payment, loan, or delivery of any money or
other thing of value prohibited by subsection (a) of this section.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or for any person acting as
an officer, agent, representative, or employee of such labor organization, to demand
or accept from the operator of any motor vehicle (as defined in part II of the
Interstate Commerce Act) employed in the transportation of property in commerce, or the employer of any such operator, any money or other thing of value
payable to such organization or to an officer, agent, representative or employee
thereof as a fee or charge for the unloading, or in connection with the unloading, of
the cargo of such vehicle: Provided, That nothing in this paragraph shall be
construed to make unlawful any payment by an employer to any of his employees as
compensation for their services as employees.

Id. § 186.
278. See Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 6, at 343-44.
279. See infra notes 299-310 and accompanying text.
280. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a). This section provides in full:
(a) The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor
organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its
members as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each such person, taking into
account the special problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its
money and property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members and
to manage, invest, and expend the same in accordance with its constitution and
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creates a civil remedy against breaching fiduciaries.

81

Section 501 (c), a

RICO predicate offense, provides:
Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or
converts to his own use, or the use of another, any of the moneys, funds,
securities, property, or other assets of a labor organization of which he is an
officer, or by which he is employed, directly or indirectly, shall be fined not
2 82
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
While section 501 (c) has been subject to some interpretation, it is clearly
limited to those individuals reasonably closely related to the labor
organization, not to strangers to the organization. 83
Section 664 is at once more general and specific. Also a RICO
predicate offense, it provides that anyone who embezzles anything of value
from "any employer welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefit plan,
bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain
from dealing with such organization as an adverse party or in behalf of an adverse
party in any matter connected with his duties and from holding or acquiring any
pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interests of such organization, and to account to the organization for any profit received by him in whatever
capacity in connection with transactions conducted by him or under his direction on
behalf of the organization. A general exculpatory provision in the constitution and
bylaws of such a labor organization or a general exculpatory resolution of a
governing body purporting to relieve any such person of liability for breach of the
duties declared by this section shall be void as against public policy.
Id.
281. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b). This section provides in full:
(b) When any officer, agent, shop steward, or representative of any labor
organization is alleged to have violated the duties declared in subsection (a) of this
section and the labor organization or its governing board or officers refuse or fail to
sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief within a
reasonable time after being requested to do so by any member of the labor
organization, such member may sue such officer, agent, shop steward, or representative in any district court of the United States or in any State court of competent
jurisdiction to recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief
for the benefit of the labor organization. No such proceeding shall be brought
except upon leave of the court obtained upon verified application and for good cause
shown, which application may be made ex parte. The trial judge may allot a
reasonable part of the recovery in any action under this subsection to pay the fees of
counsel prosecuting the suit at the instance of the member of the labor organization
and to compensate such member for any expenses necessarily paid or incurred by
him in connection with the litigation.
Id.
282. 29 U.S.C. § 501(c).
283. See, e.g., United States v. Capanegro, 576 F.2d 973 (2d Cir.) (lawyer who earned
76% of his gross professional income from union was employed by the union within the
meaning of section 501(c)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 928 (1978); United States v. Sullivan,
498 F.2d 146 (1st Cir.) (bonded employee of local union's business office was within
statutory provision), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974).
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or of any fund connected therewith, shall be fined not more than $10,000,
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. '2 84 Section 664 is narrower
than section 501 (c) because it applies only to plans subject to ERISA.286 It
is broader because it applies to anyone, and is not limited to officers or those
employed by the union.2 8
These statutes, however, have a similar purpose: "to preserve the
designated funds for those entitled to their benefits. 2 87 As a result, "the
prohibitory language of both statutes should be given similar interpretations and be applied to similar types of conduct. ' 288 These statutes may be
violated when the defendant commits at least two types of offenses: "those
involving the authorized use of funds and those involving the unauthorized
use of funds."2 8 9 In either case, courts have found that criminal intent is an
essential element of the offense.29 0
284. 18 U.S.C. § 664.
285. Id. In contrast, section 501(c) applies to any union property. 29 U.S.C. § 501(c).

286. 18 U.S.C. § 664.
287. United States v. Andreen, 628 F.2d 1236, 1242 (9th Cir. 1980) (defendant, an
attorney, was indicted with several co-defendants for various crimes relating to embezzlement of union trust funds; court found evidence sufficient to establish that defendant, the
attorney for the pension trust fund who attended meetings and concealed information
concerning trustees' salary and expenses, aided and abetted the embezzlement of the
welfare or benefit funds). See also United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1980)
(companion case to Andreen), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981).
288. Andreen, 628 F.2d at 1242.
289. United States v. Dixon, 609 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1980) (defendant, president
of local and member of board of district union and vice president of international union,
accepted reimbursement of travel expenses from both local, district, and international
union; the court held that government must prove that defendant lacked good faith belief
that expense was for legitimate benefit of union to prove violation of § 501(c)). See also
United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1976) (former president of local was found
guilty of five counts of violating § 501(c) in charging union for European vacation, personal
legal fees, personal automobile, personal travel and gasoline expenses; court distinguished
between cases of lack of authorization and cases where authorization was present but
expenses were for personal benefit), affd after remand, 570 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1978).
290. See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 675 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1982) (defendant,
General Secretary-Treasurer of HEREIU, was indicted for various counts of embezzeling
from union; government proceeded on theory that defendant used union property
"including its airplane" for wrongful purpose; court found sufficient evidence of fraudulent
intent); United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.) (defendants, officers and
employees of Teamsters local, were accused of conspiring to destroy employer's trucks in
effort to coerce company to recognize union; indictment also included count charging
violation of 501(c); district court dismissed the indictment; ninth circuit reversed, holding,
inter alia, that the indictment alleging fraudulent intent to use union funds for illegal
purpose was sufficient), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981); United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d
1354, 1363 (9th Cir. 1980) (court found union attorney's active participation in unauthorized deferred compensation scheme was sufficient to prove criminal intent); United States
v. Durnin, 632 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1980) (receipt by local union president on three
occasions of duplicate expenses from local and district unions sufficient to establish
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There has been some confusion in the cases concerning other essential
elements of these offenses.2 91 For example, defendants have claimed that
the government must plead and prove lack of authorization and lack of
union benefit.2 92 In United States v. Andreen 9 3 the Ninth Circuit held
that in cases involving a lack of union authorization, the government need
not prove lack of union benefit. 94 Subsequently, that court went further
and held "that neither lack of authorization nor lack of good faith belief in
union benefit is an essential element of § 501(c)," or, by implication, of
section 664.295 The court found that section 501(c) was intended
to combine the common law theft crimes and also outlaw acts which might
fall into the 'gaps or crevices' separating those crimes. . . . [The Court
saw] no evidence that Congress, in enacting § 501(c), intended to add any
new elements to the common law theft offenses except those necessary to
show federal jurisdiction and subject matter: that the accused is (1) an
official or employee (2) of a labor organization (3) involved in interstate
commerce and that (4) the funds belong to the labor organization .... 291
Thus, to prove a section 501(c) violation, the government must prove the
jurisdictional elements, fraudulent intent, and conversion to the defendant's or another's use. 97 Good faith and authorization are relevant to rebut
fraudulent intent to misuse union funds); United States v. Bane, 583 F.2d 832 (6th Cir.
1978) (defendant, president of Teamsters local, received subsidy from International to hire
experienced union organizer; instead, defendant hired Jimmy Hoffa's brother, a "noshow"
who did no organizing work for the local; court held that jury instructions were proper
insofar as they focused jury attention on requisite fraudulent intent), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1127 (1979); United States v. Santiago, 528 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir.) (defendant, president of
local union and administrator and trustee of union's welfare fund, willfully diverted monies
earmarked for welfare fund into general coffers and used those funds for his personal use;
court found sufficient evidence of fraudulent intent), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 972 (1976).
291. Courts treat section 664 cases the same as those involving section 501(c). See
United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1334 n.19 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1055 (1981).
292. See, e.g., Dixon, 609 F.2d 827,829 (5th Cir. 1980) (defendant, president of local
and member of executive board of district union and vice president of international,
received reimbursement for travel expenses from all three unions; court held that
government must prove that defendant lacked good faith belief that expenditure was for
legitimate benefit of union).
293. 628 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1980).
294. Id. at 1242-43.
295. Thordarson, 646 F.2d at 1334.
296. Id. at 1334-35 (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 271 (1952), and
United States v. Bane, 583 F.2d at 836 n.9 (6th Cir. 1978)) (considerable overlap in
embezzlement, stealing, purloining and conversion grouped together in federal statute
reflects efforts of codifiers to prevent guilty from slipping through gaps and crevices which
separated theft crimes at common law).
297. Thordarson, 646 F.2d at 1335.
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a showing of intent.2 98

Defendants have devised numerous ways in which to raid union or
benefit funds. For example, some schemes have been reasonably straight
forward. During Jimmy Hoffa's tenure as Teamster President, one
Teamster local hired Hoffa's brother as an organizer. He was "a 'no-show'
and did no organizing work. ....
-9"Other defendants have used union
property for personal use;300 padded expenses; 30 ' billed the union for
30 3
personal expenses or trips; 302 received unauthorized salary or bonuses;
had the union pay for personal legal fees; 0 " and had the union pay fictitious
employees and excessive severance pay. 30 5 Other defendants have benefitted third parties, for example, by using union funds to purchase gifts for
and to entertain people not connected with the union or its business.30 6
298. Id. Other courts have held that lack of good faith and lack of authorization are
essential elements to be proven by the government. See, e.g., Dixon, 609 F.2d at 829
(president of local union, who was also member of district executive board and vice
president of international, accepted reimbursement for travel expenses from all three
unions); Bane, 583 F.2d at 836 (president of Teamsters local used subsidy from
International to hire Jimmy Hoffa's brother, a no-show who did no organizing for the local
union); United States v. Santiago, 528 F.2d 1130, 1133-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
972 (1976) (president of local union, also trustee and administrator of welfare fund,
diverted money from fund to general coffers of union, whence he diverted it to his own use).
299. Bane, 583 F.2d at 834.
300. See, e.g., Gibson, 675 F.2d 825 (violation of § 501(c) based in part on use of
union's airplane to go on trip for personal pleasure).
301. See, e.g., United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610 (6th Cir. 1982) (violation of
501 (c) based on overstated expenses), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 823 (1983); Durnin,632 F.2d
1297 (violation of 501(c) based on overstated expenses).
302. See, e.g., Santiago,528 F.2d 1130 (violation of § 501(c) based in part on use of
union funds to pay personal travel expenses to Switzerland, France and the Virgin Islands);
Nell, 526 F.2d 1223 (violation of 501(c) based in part on use of union funds to pay personal
travel expenses to Europe).
303. See, e.g., Sullivan, 498 F.2d 146 (1 st Cir.) (violation of § 501 (c) based in part on
receipt of bonuses and salary increases with knowledge that those funds were not
authorized), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974).
304. See, e.g., Nell, 526 F.2d 1223 (violation of § 501 (c) based in part on use of union
funds to pay legal expenses incurred in getting 1953 Mann Act conviction and 1970 Florida
bribery conviction overturned).
305. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 596 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1979) (violation of §
501 (c) by high ranking officer in local union based on payments to two fictional employees,
funds which were deposited into maintenance account and on payment of excessive
severance pay for former employees, funds which he then converted to personal use).
306. See, e.g., United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendant, chief
executive officer of local union affiliated with teamsters, prosecuted under § 501 (c) for use
of union funds to entertain Aladena "Jimmy" Fratianno when expenditures were not for
union's benefit), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982). Interestingly, Fratianno was an FBI
informant who was able to report on activities of the La Cosa Nostra. United States v.
Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Somewhat more novel, the defendants in UnitedStates v. Robinson30 7 sold
union classification to unqualified seamen. Elsewhere, the Ninth Circuit

found that the use of union property to commit criminal acts might
constitute a section 501 violation. 08
Highly relevant to the case under analysis, the Second Circuit

affirmed the judgment of sentence of a union's lawyer for charging
excessive fees and for collecting fees for "services neither performed nor

ever intended to be performed." 30 9 Finally, some defendants have violated
the statute by a complex plan to secure pensions to which they were not
entitled. 10
The PSI Report evidences several possible violations of sections 501
and 664. One obvious instance is employment of friends of Nicodemo
Scarfo who performed no work for the union.31 1 The clearest violation is the
duplication of administrative services authorized by the trustees of the
local's dental plan.312 A violation can be shown if no work is performed for a
fee received. Presumably that applies to members of the Bruno crime
family who allegedly received payments through Lawrence Smith. Apparently, the motivation for those payments was to continue to receive the
family's blessing to secure the local contract. Prosecution would be
appropriate under section 664 because it is doubtful that the crime family
members have a sufficient relationship to the union to come within
provisions of section 501. 313
307. 512 F.2d 491 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 853 (1975).
308. United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1981) (defendants, officers
and employees of Teamsters local, were accused of conspiring to destroy employer's trucks
to coerce recognition of the union; court held indictment sufficiently alleged § 501(c)
violation).
309. United States v. Capanegro, 576 F.2d 973, 976 (2d Cir. 1978) (defendant,
attorney retained by local union, billed union in excess of $100,000 during four month
period; section 501 (c) violation was based on fact bills were knowingly false for services not
performed).
310. United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1980) (court found active
participation in unauthorized deferred compensation scheme was sufficient to prove that
defendants had requisite criminal intent to deprive trust beneficiaries of trust fund); see
United States v. Andreen, 628 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1980).
311. PSI Report, supra note 7, at 66. "The New Jersey Division of Gaming
Enforcement. . . found among other things, that Gerace had appointed five associates of
Scarfo to key union positions, had met frequently with Scarfo, and had put up $10,000 bail
for Scarfo in a critical case." Id.
312. See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.
313. Cf. United States v. Capanegro, 576 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1978) (§ 501(c) violation
based in part of excessive legal fees charged to local union). The funds in question are
employee benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA as required by section 664. See Hotel
& Res. Emp. & Bar. Int'l Union Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1983) (court
held that provisions of New Jersey Casino Control Act governing registration of labor
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Smith and perhaps HCA employees would also be subject to indictment for violating those provisions. Their relationship is probably close
enough to state a section 501 violation. 14 In addition, even if some work
were performed, a defendant may violate those provisions by charging
excessive fees.3 15 Nor could they contend that the money was merely
passed on to a third person. It is clear that one violates those provisions by
converting union property to one's own or another's use.3 16
Obviously, members of Local 54 who participated in the scheme
would also be subject to prosecution even if they retained none of the money
skimmed from the dental plan. 31 7 The local officials might attempt to
defend on the basis of authorization. 1 8 Undoubtedly, the contract received
facially correct formal approval. It is important to note that this may be an
insufficient defense: the government would almost certainly be able to show
that "the 'union' presumably would have objected if it had been able to
31 9
speak freely.
It would appear that evidence heard by the subcommittee would
support an indictment for violations of sections 501 and 664. In turn, those
violations constitute predicate acts sufficient to support a RICO
indictment.
CONCLUSION

The PSI Report apparently confirms the long held view that bringing
casino gambling to Atlantic City would be lucrative for organized crime.
Contrary to the subcommittee's view that the present law is inadequate to
deal with the problem, this Article suggests that RICO was designed to
combat the very kind of union corruption identified by the subcommittee.
Further, it suggests how the government might pursue a RICO prosecution: (1) Local 54 would be an appropriate enterprise; (2) both the
enterprise and various acts by members of the enterprise meet the
organizations and disqualification criteria for casino licenses were preempted by federal
labor law and ERISA), vacated, 464 U.S. 990 (1984).
314. Cf. United States v. Capanegro, 576 F.2d 973 (violation of § 501(c) based in part
on excessive legal fees charged to local union).
315. Id.
316. See, e.g., United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1981) (violation of §
501(c) based on chief executive officer of local union's expenditure of union funds to
entertain "Jimmy" Fratianno for non-union purposes).
317. Id.
318. See, e.g., United States v. Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1980) (union
officials and employees were indicted for acts arising out of violent efforts to coerce
employer to recognize union; court held indictment sufficiently alleged fraudulent intent to
misuse union property).
319. Id. at 1336-37.
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interstate commerce requirement; (3) there is a nexus between the several
potential defendants and the enterprise because those individuals had a
position in the enterprise or were in control of the affairs of the enterprise
and their conduct affected it; and (4) a pattern of racketeering activity
might readily be shown by proof of the repeated raids on the dental plan. As
with any attempt to purge America of organized crime influence, the
difficulty will be the production of evidence in court, not the drafting of new

legislation.

